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ABSTRACT
A significant concern in healthcare is that of patient privacy and how organizations protect
against unauthorized access to protected health information. The federal government has
responded by instituting policies and guidelines on requirements for protection. However, the
policy language leaves areas open to interpretation by those following the guidelines. Reporting
to the Office for Civil Rights and/or the patient can open an organization to risk of financial and
possible criminal penalties. There is a risk of harm to their reputation which could impact patient
visits and market share. Therefore, Privacy Officers might view risk in different ways and
therefore handle breach reporting differently. Privacy Officers are responsible for determining
an individual organization’s breach reportability status. Their processes may vary dependent on
their knowledge of the policy, the status of previous reported breaches, and their framing of an
incident. This research aims to explore the following factors: (1) personal and organizational
knowledge, (2) prior breach status, (3) and scenario framing, to explore if Prospect Theory is
applicable to the choices a Privacy Officer makes regarding breach determination. The study
uses primary data collection through a survey that includes loss and gain scenarios in accordance
with Prospect Theory. Individuals listed as Privacy Officers within the American Health
Information Management Association (AHIMA) were the target audience for the survey.
Univariate, Bivariate, Multivariate, and Post Regression techniques were used to analyze the data
collected. The findings of the study supported the theoretical framework and provided industry
and public affairs implications. These findings show that there is a gap where Privacy Officers
have to make their own decisions and there is a difference in the types of decisions they are
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making on a day to day basis. Future guidance and policies need to address these gaps and can
use the insight provided by this study.
Keywords: Healthcare, Privacy, Breach, Privacy Officer, Prospect Theory
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CHAPTER ONE: INTRODUCTION
The following chapter outlines the state of patient privacy including current federal
policy, details the significance, discusses the theoretical framework, and describes the
methodological approach of the study.
State of Patient Privacy
The Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act (HIPAA) passed on August 21,
1996, was enacted to, among other things, help protect the privacy and security of a patient’s
protected health information (PHI) (LaTour & Eichenwald-Maki, 2006). This legislation
established patient rights to their healthcare information as well as restrictions on breaches
(unauthorized disclosures of patient information). However, it lacked enforcement capabilities
by the federal government, which negated its effects (Collins, 2007).
Under the American Recovery and Reinvestment Act (ARRA), a portion of the Health
Information Technology for Economic and Clinical Health (HITECH) Act strengthened HIPAA
laws including enforcement, penalties, and breach notification (LaTour & Eichenwald-Maki,
2006). The breach language was vague, so in 2013 the Omnibus Final Rule passed to clarify the
ambiguities (Wilder, Bennett, Bianchi, & Peters, 2013). The Final Rule updated some key
terminology; however, it did not provide strict guidance to identify reportable breaches. This has
left gaps in the legislation where individuals and organizations are making decisions about
patient privacy concerns.
Significance of the Study
The legislation requires that facilities designate privacy officials as the individuals in a
healthcare organization responsible for identifying, determining, and reporting breaches of
1

patient privacy to the oversight body, the Office for Civil Rights (Modifications to the HIPAA
Privacy, Security, Enforcement, and Breach Notification Rules, 2013; Liginlal, Sim, Khansa &
Fearn, 2012). Many facilities have termed this position as a Privacy Officer. A problem not
previously identified is whether the Privacy Officers of organizations are weighing the
implications of reporting and if that knowledge is affecting their choices to report breaches that
do occur to the Office for Civil Rights, the oversight body. This problem is identified as a public
affairs issue as it impacts governance policy, public practices, and individual patient concerns.
If a privacy breach occurs, Privacy Officers make essential choices, based on
organizational knowledge, which can affect the well-being of patients. Federal policy tends to be
intentionally vague for operational purposes and moves slowly in terms of updating for current
trends (Salamon, 2002). In 2016, the Government Accountability Office recommended that the
Department of Health and Human Services increase their oversight of security and privacy
guidance provided to healthcare facilities covered by HIPAA legislation (2016). Their
investigation found that, due to the increased use of electronic health records, there is more
vulnerability of patient information to cyber-based threats (GAO, 2016).
While there are guidelines, in the case of HIPAA and breach notifications, the
organization and its Privacy Officer(s) determine whether to report a breach. Therefore, there is a
need to understand if these individuals make the best choice for patients and not just the right
choice for their organization. There are high costs associated with maintaining patient privacy as
well as high costs when patient privacy is breached which may be taken into account when
deciding whether to report a breach (Coate & MacDonald, 2002; Fleming, Culler, McCorkel,
Becker, & Ballard, 2011; Adler-Milstein, Green, & Bates, 2013; McMillan, 2015; Khansa et.al,
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2012; Ponemon, 2012; 2013; 2014; 2015; 2016; Campbell, Gordon, Loeb & Zhou, 2003; Khansa
& Liginlal, 2009; Andoh-Baido & Bryson, 2006). Breaches to privacy of healthcare information
can be detrimental to patients in many ways, including the emotional upheaval of the knowledge
that others may have access to their personal medical information, the potential financial and
identity theft, and actual harm from unnecessary or unobtainable treatment if an unauthorized
user expends their available services or receives treatment, which ends up on the patient’s record
as the patient’s history (Korolov, 2015; Amori, 2008).
Theoretical Framework
This study aims to understand how Privacy Officers are making choices about
breach determination. Prospect Theory is the framework used to guide the study. Prospect
theory is robust and has many implications for management and healthcare. The theory evolved
over 300 years from the concept of utility to Risk Theory to Prospect Theory (Tversky &
Kahneman, 1992). Throughout the years the research has built upon the exiting foundation,
keeping the original constructs and adding new ones with each iteration to include Utility,
Diminishing Marginal Utility, Risk Behavior, Reference Points, Value Functions, Weighting,
Framing, and Loss Aversion (Arrow, 1971; Briggs 2015; Bernoulli, 1738; Kahneman & Tversky,
1979; Tversky & Kahneman, 1991). For this study, Prospect Theory is used to examine
individual choices based on prior knowledge (reference points), framing effects (loss or gain),
and decision weights (Kahneman & Tversky, 1979).
Prospect theory finds that an individual will take a risk in proportion to their utility from
the outcome, their satisfaction level with the chance of gain, rather than taking into account the
proportion that the gain will occur (Bernoulli, 1738). However, utility does not increase at a
3

consistent rate and the more one has of something, the increase in utility diminishes (Marshall,
1890; Holmes et al., 2011). Individuals fall into one of three categories (i.e., risk averse, risk
neutral, and risk seeking), which affects behavior and when evaluating gains, a person is risk
averse and when evaluating losses, a person is risk seeking (Pratt, 1964; Arrow, 1971;
Kahneman & Tversky, 1979). Actual probabilities are overweighted or underweighted when
deciding whether to take a risk. Framing indicates that the outcome of risk will determine
willingness to take the risk, if the outcome is a gain, the likelihood of an individual taking the
risk falls on a convex or concave curve dependent on the outcome of the risk (Kahneman &
Tversky, 1979). Loss aversion simulates that a person will feel a loss harder than a gain and that
hurt from a loss plateaus (Tversky & Kahneman, 1991).
Prospect Theory in healthcare research is still relatively new. The theory has been used
for individual behavior for quite some time; however, its implications to management/healthcare
analysis is wide open. This theoretical framework helps to explain a Privacy Officer’s view of
the risk of potential privacy breaches. A conceptual map was created using the theory’s
constructs and this was used to formulate a survey for analysis.
Methodological Approach
The research questions and hypotheses for this study are as follows:
RQ1: Does the Privacy Officers’ reference point based on knowledge levels affect their choice
to report a breach of patient information?
H1: Higher percentage of years employed in the healthcare field is positively associated with
reporting future indefinable breaches of healthcare information in a general scenario.
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H2: Higher percentage of years employed in the healthcare field is positively associated with
reporting future indefinable breaches of healthcare information in a gain scenario.
H3: Higher percentage of years employed in the healthcare field is positively associated with
reporting future indefinable breaches of healthcare information in a loss scenario.

H4: Lower level of self-reported knowledge in healthcare privacy is negatively associated with
reporting future indefinable breaches of healthcare information in a general scenario.
H5: Lower level of self-reported knowledge in healthcare privacy is negatively associated with
reporting future indefinable breaches of healthcare information in a gain scenario.
H6: Lower level of self-reported knowledge in healthcare privacy is negatively associated with
reporting future indefinable breaches of healthcare information in a loss scenario.

H7: Higher levels of education are positively associated with reporting future indefinable
breaches of healthcare information in a general scenario.
H8: Higher levels of education are positively associated with reporting future indefinable
breaches of healthcare information in a gain scenario.
H9: Higher levels of education are positively associated with reporting future indefinable
breaches of healthcare information in a loss scenario.

H10: Attainment of a Certified Healthcare Privacy and Security credential is positively
associated with reporting future indefinable breaches of healthcare information in a general
scenario.
5

H11: Attainment of a Certified Healthcare Privacy and Security credential is positively
associated with reporting future indefinable breaches of healthcare information in a gain
scenario.
H12: Attainment of a Certified Healthcare Privacy and Security credential is positively
associated with reporting future indefinable breaches of healthcare information in a loss scenario.

H13: Attainment of a Registered Health Information Administrator or Technician credential is
positively associated with reporting future indefinable breaches of healthcare information in a
general scenario.
H14: Attainment of a Registered Health Information Administrator or Technician credential is
positively associated with reporting future indefinable breaches of healthcare information in a
gain scenario.
H15: Attainment of a Registered Health Information Administrator or Technician credential is
positively associated with reporting future indefinable breaches of healthcare information in a
loss scenario.

RQ2: Does the Privacy Officers’ reference points based on past reporting affect their choice to
report a breach of patient information?
H16: Prior reporting of a breach of healthcare information to the Office for Civil Rights is
positively associated with reporting future indefinable breaches of healthcare information in a
general scenario.
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H17: Prior reporting of a breach of healthcare information to the Office for Civil Rights is
positively associated with reporting future indefinable breaches of healthcare information in a
gain scenario.
H18: Prior reporting of a breach of healthcare information to the Office for Civil Rights is
positively associated with reporting future indefinable breaches of healthcare information in a
loss scenario.

RQ3: Does the framing of a scenario affect Privacy Officers’ choice to report a breach of
information?
H19: A breach of healthcare information scenario framed as a gain is positively associated with
privacy officers classifying the breach as reportable to the Office for Civil Rights.
H20: A breach of healthcare information scenario framed as a loss is negatively associated with
privacy officers classifying the breach as reportable to the Office for Civil Rights.
The population targeted for this study is American Health Information Management
Association (AHIMA) affiliated Privacy Officers. This specific population is the focus due to
HIPAA regulations that all healthcare covered entities designate a Privacy Officer to be
responsible for facility requirements. Privacy Officers are likely to be AHIMA members due to
the nature of the regulations, ensuring access, privacy, and security of patient records. The
AHIMA mission states “Transforming healthcare by leading HIM, Informatics, and Information
Governance” (AHIMA, 2018, para. 1). Survey questionnaires, created with Prospect Theory,
included demographic and personal information questions, prior breach reporting details, and
framed scenarios from both a loss and gain perspective.
7

Models using multivariate logistic regression for analysis for each particular dependent
variable are necessary as there are multiple categorical dependent variables. The dependent
variables are the Privacy Officers’ responses to whether or not they would report a breach in
response to prompts provided through the survey. The control and independent variables consist
of categorical and continuous variables. These include demographic variables (i.e., age, gender,
level of education, credentials, current employment information) and previous breach history
factors (i.e., number, size, impact). Furthermore, post regression testing for predicted
probabilities was conducted and the results presented display the average predicted probabilities
calculated using the regression results.
A pilot study of the AHIMA Engage website for accessibility of the population
determined the feasibility of the study. AHIMA Engage is a networking site which houses a
member directory. AHIMA members are listed and classified by their account profile. The
initial review of the site found 479 individuals with a Privacy designation in their job title.
Organization of Chapters
Chapter two of this paper details the findings from the literature review which includes
the background and history of privacy in healthcare as well as information regarding the federal
policies to date. Chapter two also covers the theoretical framework through its iterations over
the years and then applies it to the problem of privacy breach determination, including the
creation of a conceptual model. Chapter three provides information about the methodology used
for the study, including the study design, population and sample parameters, survey creation, and
details about the analytical methods applied. Chapter four provides the results of the analyses
and interprets the findings. Chapter five discusses the hypotheses and research questions, the
8

theoretical and practical contributions, the public affairs implications, limitations of the study
and areas for future research.
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CHAPTER TWO: LITERATURE REVIEW
This literature review comprehensively details the history and background of privacy
laws within the healthcare industry up through the HITECH Act/Omnibus Rule, including where
they are strong and where they fall short. The chapter discusses relevant research around how
the privacy laws impact healthcare facilities and whether those facilities then ensure or fail to
protect patient privacy. Finally, the chapter introduces Prospect Theory and proposes its
application to understand better how Privacy Officers, as agents of healthcare facilities, make
decisions that ensure or fail to ensure patient privacy.
Privacy Policy
This section provides an overview of the history and background of patient privacy laws
within healthcare, including areas of strength and weakness, and demonstrates its importance as
a public affairs topic.
Inception of HIPAA
The United States government defined healthcare privacy and access to information as a
social issue when it passed the HIPAA federal legislation in 1996 (LaTour & Eichenwald-Maki,
2006). It was a groundbreaking piece of legislation for the healthcare industry and the nation as
a whole. HIPAA’s purpose is to, among other things, safeguard the PHI held by a covered entity
(CE) and their business associates (BA) including protecting PHI from unauthorized disclosures,
otherwise known as breaches (LaTour & Eichenwald-Maki, 2006; Collins, 2007). The
legislation defines PHI as any individually identifiable piece of information, whether it is oral or
recorded, that contains one or more of 18 identifiers including name, date of birth, social security
number, address, account number, and health plan numbers among others (California Office of
10

Statewide Health Planning and Development, 2015). Covered entities (CEs) are defined as
healthcare providers (hospitals, physicians, etc.), healthcare plans (insurance companies,
company health plans, government programs), and clearinghouses (processes data for providers
and plans) (U.S. Department of Health and Human Services, 2011b).
Business associates (BA) are official contractors for CEs who perform functions for the
business but are not employees of the organization (Oachs & Watters, 2016). If the BA handles
PHI on behalf of the CE, they are then subject to all of the security rules under HIPAA as well as
some of the privacy rules. All BA – CE relationships require a business associate agreement
(BAA) that outlines the accountability of the BA to the CE including a network and user
agreement and auditing procedures (Kim, Browe, Logan, Holm, Hack, & Machado, 2013).
Once HIPAA passed in 1996, covered entities needed to make sweeping changes; the
handling of patient information is now of great concern. Collins (2007) identified that a crucial
item lacking in HIPAA was the ability to enforce the rights and responsibilities it had
established. There was no mechanism to force reporting of violations to individuals, so patients
were not aware of violations of their personal information. The author stated that the legislation
did not provide recourse for patients who had their privacy violated. The legislation was thus
labeled as “Toothless HIPAA” (Collins, 2007).
An individual could file a complaint with the Department of Health and Human Services
(DHHS), but the legislation did not compel the agency to act and they rarely investigated or
imposed fines (Collins, 2007). Patients were only able to have recourse through lawsuits
classified under other means including common law torts for invasion of privacy and breach of
confidentiality. This was a complicated process, and as years have passed, various judgments
11

have chipped away the ability to successfully bring a lawsuit to fruition (Collins, 2007; Winn,
2002).
State laws attempted to fill the gap in specific areas, but as of 2001, 35 out of 50 states
had a Right of Access clause, and only 6 out of 50 had a Right to Amend clause regarding
hospital records, the numbers were even less for physician records (Pritts, 2002). The Right to
Amend enables patients the ability to request an amendment to their PHI from a CE (Oachs &
Watters, 2016). There was a need to provide an impetus for healthcare organizations to uphold
HIPAA requirements through new legislation.
Defining a Breach
In 2009, President Obama passed the American Recovery and Reinvestment Act (ARRA)
to help stimulate the economy. The Healthcare Information Technology for Economic and
Clinical Health (HITECH) Act was a portion of ARRA and focused on ‘Breach Notification’.
Under these guidelines, a healthcare organization must notify patients and the Office for Civil
Rights (OCR) of instances of breached PHI (Warner, 2013).
The Department of Health and Human Services (DHHS) newly defined breaches,
specifically in terms of healthcare information. Reportable breaches are instances where there
has been an “acquisition, access, use, or disclosure of [Protected Health Information] in a manner
not permitted by the HIPAA Privacy Rule which compromises the security or privacy of the
[PHI]” (U.S. Department of Health and Human Services, 2011a, p.2).
Privacy Officer Designation
The federal legislation, Modifications to the HIPAA Privacy, Security, Enforcement, and
Breach Notification Rules (2013), instituted that all CEs are required to have a designated
12

privacy official to develop and implement the facility’s privacy/security policies and procedures
The specific legislation language only discusses a privacy official in terms of being responsible
for the P&P development and implementation, there is a separate bullet point that the facility
must have a designated contact person for handling complaints and investigations It is important
to note that the legislation itself has many standards for facilities to implement, however the only
personnel designation comes from 164.530 Personnel designations with the language outlined
above (Modifications to the HIPAA Privacy, Security, Enforcement, and Breach Notification
Rules, 2013). However, many facilities and studies view these positions as interconnected as
they are under the same header in the legislation. The industry has identified this role as a
Privacy Officer.
Liginlal and colleagues (2012) identified this individual as responsible for creating,
maintaining and enforcing internal policies and procedures that align with HIPAA. Additional
responsibilities include identifying breaches of PHI, determining if they are reportable and if so
reporting the breach to the oversight body (Liginlal et al., 2012). There are sample job
descriptions to help create or outline the responsibilities of this position. Two notable examples
come from a Sample (Chief) Privacy Officer Job Description from the Privacy and Security
Council (2015) and from the Introduction to Health Information Privacy and Security textbook
by Laurie Reinhart-Thompson (2013). Both include a general purpose statement which states
the Privacy Officer is responsible for the organization’s Privacy Program, implementation and
maintenance of the facility’s P&P, and compliance with the program. Both sample job
descriptions state a Bachelor’s degree in health information management or other related field
would be required. A Certified in Healthcare Privacy and Security (CHPS) credential and/or a
13

Registered Health Information Administrator (RHIA) or Registered Health Information
Technician (RHIT) credential are recommended in both sources. The descriptions both identify
integrity as a key skill or requirement. A final note on the job descriptions from both sources
state that the name of the position may vary but that “privacy officer” is specifically mentioned
in the HIPAA regulations. (Reinhart-Thompson, 2013; AHIMA Privacy and Security Council,
2015). However, as shown above, the legislation makes mention of the “privacy official,” but
does not outline any requirements for the position including education, skills, or credentials.
Any suggested requirements for the position of Privacy Officer have come from industry.
Harm Threshold
When the HITECH portion of ARRA passed, it introduced the concept of breach
notification to federal law. There was a specific definition in which this notification must occur
when it posed “significant risk of financial, reputational, or other harm to the individual”
(Blustein & Lapidus, 2010, para. 2). In order to require notification to the patient and OCR, the
risk of harm must cross that threshold; thus the healthcare industry adopted the term ‘harm
threshold’ (Dimick, 2010; Vinson, 2011). The legislation required a risk assessment with a focus
on the harm threshold.
Assumed Risk
Those required to follow the guidelines in the healthcare industry considered the ‘harm
threshold’ language and functionalities of the breach process vague. Therefore, after an open
comment period, the Omnibus Final Rule passed in 2013 (Warner, 2013). This ruling
implemented in January 2013 and went into effect September of 2013 (Wilder, Bennett, Bianchi
& Peters, 2013). The term ‘assumed risk’ is the key change to the breach classification of
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reportable as opposed to the ‘harm threshold’ (Bendix, 2013). When a breach occurs, a facility
must assume that there is harm to the patient unless, after completion of a four-factor risk
assessment, they can prove that there was sufficient low probability of compromise to the
information (AHIMA, 2013a; AHIMA, 2013b). The four factors take into account:
(1) The nature and extent of the PHI involved, including the types of identifiers and the
likelihood of re-identification.
(2) The unauthorized person who used the PHI or to whom the disclosure was made.
(3) Whether the PHI was actually acquired or viewed.
(4) The extent to which the risk to the PHI has been mitigated (Terry, 2015).
While this specific terminology and the four factors may seem like a standard at the
federal level for determining if a breach is reportable, it can leave organizations open to their
own interpretation. Patients and their privacy are now subject to internal determinations made
by healthcare organizations, which could cause significant harm if not handled appropriately.
For example, Factor (1) should take into account whether generic or sensitive information
was involved; this includes mental health, substance abuse, human immunodeficiency virus
(HIV), cancer, genomic, or other related information (AHIMA, 2013a; AHIMA, 2013b). For
Factor (2), the recipient may have been someone with a legal obligation to protect patient
information such as another covered entity or business associate (AHIMA, 2013a; AHIMA,
2013b). Factor (3) is currently under debate regarding ransomware. Finally, Factor (4) the
facility can try to retrieve the information or ask that it be destroyed according to HIPAA
standards. All of these steps are laden with areas where Privacy Officers are making decisions,
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which can lead to vulnerability to the patient. The Patient Harm section discusses these
vulnerabilities in greater detail.
Reporting Requirements
Under the HITECH Act and the concept of breach notification, organizations are required
to notify outlined entities within a specific period of time. If a breach involves the information
of 1 to 499 people, then an organization is required to notify the individual within 60 days of the
breach and the Office for Civil Rights within 60 days after the end of the year. If a breach
involves 500 people or more the organization is required to notify the individuals within 60 days,
the Office for Civil Rights within 60 days, and must provide notification to ‘prominent media
outlets’ within 60 days (U.S. Department of Health and Human Services, 2011a).
The 2009 HITECH Act requires that breaches have associated penalties in order to
enforce compliance with the regulations. They occur when an organization has a breach due to
not following the privacy and security guidelines, and corrective action did not occur after the
incident (Holloway & Fensholt, 2013). This does not have to be the case for the future but is the
established pattern so far.
The Secretary of Health and Human Services is required to make an annual report to
Congress about the status of breaches and the penalties that were imposed. The first report made
available covered the period after implementation, September 23, 2009 to December 31, 2010.
During this period, there were 252 cases of a breach affecting 500 or more patients, which
involved 7.8 million individuals. There were 30,521 cases of a breach affecting 1-499 patients,
which involved over 50,000 individual patients (U.S. Department of Health and Human Services,
2011a).)
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The most recent report from August of 2016, covers the calendar years of 2013 to 2014,
showcases the higher number of reported privacy breaches. During this period, the numbers of
breaches involving 500 or more patients were 571 cases affecting 26.5 million individuals.
There were 86,707 cases involving less than 500 patients at a time, which affected 466,477
individuals (U.S. Department of Health and Human Services, 2016).) It is notable that the prior
period covered only a little over a year after HITECH went into effect, and this most recent
period included time after the Omnibus Final Rule went into effect.
HIPAA rules and regulations are complex, but as witnessed by the number of breach
reportings over the past few years, they are necessary. Prior research noted areas where the
regulations failed to protect patient privacy, and the federal government acted upon those with
the creation and evolution of the HIPAA legislation. While healthcare facilities are making great
strides towards protecting patient privacy, there are still many cases where they are unable to
provide protection. A recent study found while facilities may take steps to protect privacy,
including the use of advanced information technology systems along with biometric and twofactor security systems, breaches still occur with paper and electronic records (Gabriel, Noblin,
Rutherford, Walden, & Ward, 2018).
Individual facilities determine when reporting of these cases to the patients and the
federal government is necessary. While the guidelines are in place, some issues may influence
decisions outside of the four-factor risk assessment. These issues can include past history with
breaches, current trends, and financial liability. Patients are at risk for harm if the organization
and the Privacy Officer make the wrong decision.
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Factors Influencing Breach Reporting
This section reviews the relevant research around how the established privacy laws
impact healthcare facilities and whether those facilities then ensure or fail to ensure patient
privacy. The majority of the literature on patient privacy in the healthcare industry discusses the
impact of a breach on an organization, as well as the breakdown of the causes of breaches, but
there are gaps within the literature. These gaps include how the language for reporting
requirements will affect the number of breaches reported to OCR and what impact an increased
effort on reporting will have on healthcare entities.
Breach Types
Breach type can affect all four aspects of the risk assessment required under HIPAA. The
type of breach can influence the information that was in the chart, if it was accessed, if it could
be mitigated, and if an unauthorized person accessed it. OCR’s reporting mechanism divides
breaches into specific types. The types available are theft, loss, unauthorized access/disclosure,
improper disposal, hacking/IT incident and unknown/other (U.S. Department of Health and
Human Services, 2016).
Due to its accessibility on the OCR website, dissection of reported breach data of cases
involving 500 or more individuals is available numerous times in the literature (Kroll Advisory
Solutions, 2012; Wikina, 2014; Bai, Jiang, Flasher, 2017). It is notable that statistical analysis
by third parties is lacking on data breach information involving less than 500 patients per case, as
OCR has not made this data available.
For years 2013-2014, the highest percentage of breaches fell under the theft category.
However, this is a downward trend as the percentages for theft have dropped from 60% in 2009
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to 38% in 2014. The other categories fluctuate with ‘other’ being the second most common type
in 2014. Unauthorized access/disclosure rose every year but one with the third highest
percentage now at 26%, and it came in highest for 2014 for the number of individuals affected
(U.S. Department of Health and Human Services, 2016).
Breach Causality – Human Error
Studies in the past have focused on the causes behind the errors that result in privacy
breaches. (Kraemer & Carayon, 2006; Wood & Banks, 1993; Liginlal, Sim, & Khansa, 2009;
Liginlal et al., 2012). Liginlal (2009) found that human errors tend to fall into one of two
categories, slips and mistakes. The study identified errors as slips when individuals complete the
correct action but fail to execute it accurately. Examples of slips are accessing the wrong patient
chart, misdial when faxing patient information, and accessing data through unsecured methods.
The study also identified that mistakes are when individuals accurately execute the wrong action.
Examples of mistakes are accessing the wrong type of information within a chart and stolen or
lost laptop with unsecured data (Liginlal, 2009).
An organization can continue to find answers to issues that cause many types of errors;
however, studies have shown that human error is hard to eliminate (Kraemer & Carayon, 2006;
Wood & Banks, 1993; Liginlal et al., 2009; Liginlal et al., 2012). In a comparison of the causes
of breaches, Liginlal et al. (2012) showed that organizational privacy officers perceived that their
percentage of breaches occurring from human error versus other factors was very high. It is
essential to understand the different ways an error occurs to help mitigate the causing factors, but
an organization must be cognizant that certain human errors will occur regardless.
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Cybercrime & Ransomware
Human errors are not the only threat to the safety of patient privacy. New studies have
shown that there has been a shift from primarily internal causes of breaches to external
(Ponemon, 2016). The Federal Emergency Management Agency has identified external attacks,
such as cybercrime and ransomware, as an area of emerging concern (Blanke & McGrady,
2016). While federal assistance is being determined, with HHS potentially collaborating with
the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) and The National Institute of Standards and
Technology (NIST), they have not issued formal guidance. This means facilities are still trying
to understand and mitigate risk on their own (Frank, 2016).
Cybercrime has been an emerging threat as healthcare entities are vulnerable with the
widespread use of electronic health records and the proliferation of networked systems (Kruse,
Frederick, Jacobson & Monticone, 2016; AHC Media LLC, 2016; Blanke &McGrady, 2016).
Cases of cybercrime typically involve theft of medical records for a multitude of reasons that
could include identity theft or medical fraud, which is detailed in the Patient Harm (Kruse et al.,
2016).
A specific area of concern is ransomware. The Office for Civil Rights defined
ransomware as:
…a type of malware (malicious software) distinct from other malware; its
defining characteristic is that it attempts to deny access to user’s data, usually by
encrypting the data with a key known only to the hacker who deployed the
malware, until a ransom is paid. After the user’s data is encrypted, the
ransomware directs the user to pay the ransom to the hacker … in order to receive
a decryption key. (U.S. Department of Health and Human Services, 2016, p.1).
While there has been a significant amount of peer-reviewed research into cybercrime,
ransomware is still relatively new. A systematic literature review of these concepts in 2016
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yielded mostly news articles, with few journals producing peer-reviewed research on
ransomware to date (Kruse, Frederick, Jacobson, and Monticone). This is an emerging profitable
business venture for hackers, to gain access to a medical organization’s system and restrict
access to the organization itself in exchange for ransom (Eisenmann, 2009). This specific type
of breach has been under question by the industry to determine if it is reportable, because due to
its nature it would affect a large number of individuals. OCR issued unofficial guidance stating
that it would be a “fact specific determination” (U.S. Department of Health and Human Services,
2016, p.7). In cases of ransomware, the hacker may disable a computer or system from usage
until the organization pays the ransom, which does not necessarily mean the hacker accessed
information on the device/system. Therefore, OCR recommends a fact specific-determination
rather than a rigid definition. However, this leaves it open for interpretation by the healthcare
facility and Privacy Officer. Breaches can occur on a variety of fronts and may be hard to
anticipate, leaving facilities to be reactive rather than using a proactive prevention model.
Financial Effects of Privacy and Breaches
Privacy has a considerable financial impact on healthcare organizations. Every layer of
privacy, from prevention to mitigation, can have an impact on the bottom line of a healthcare
facility. A breach of patient information can be detrimental to an organization, through direct
costs (penalties, lawsuits) as well as indirect costs such as lower revenue due to decreased market
share (Khansa et al., 2012; Ponemon Institute, 2016; McMillan, 2015; Boerner, 2010). The
financial impact a privacy breach incurs on an organization could be substantial to a larger
organization and possibly even fatal to a smaller organization. Due to these factors, it is crucial
to understand how healthcare organizations are reacting to the policy.
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Prevention & Front-End Costs
Ideally, if asked about the need for healthcare organizations to protect patient privacy, all
facilities might agree. However, there are significant upfront costs, those associated with
prevention and protecting patient privacy, as required under HIPAA. When first introduced,
estimated costs to implement HIPAA protections included education strategy and assessment,
program management, governance, electronic transaction line items, security line items, and
privacy line items all adding up to a range of $10,000 for a physician group practice to $14
million for a large integrated system (Coate & MacDonald, 2002).
The HITECH Act had requirements for covered healthcare facilities to not just implement
electronic health records but to implement systems that worked in such a way that provide
meaningful and securely used data (LaTour & Eichenwald-Maki, 2013). While the federal
government provided funding as an incentive for meeting Meaningful Use criteria, the monetary
amounts were not necessarily enough to offset the costs of implementation (Fleming, Culler,
McCorkel, Becker, & Ballard, 2011). Fleming et al. (2011) found that the cost for
implementation of a system that would meet meaningful use in the first year alone would be
$162,000 with an additional $85,500 in maintenance fees for a 5-physician practice. AdlerMilstein, Green, and Bates (2013) in a pilot study found that only 27% of physician practices
would have a positive return on investment after five years.
These studies are not taking into account the fact that Meaningful Use criteria have
changed as it evolved from Stage 1 through Stage 3, and that a system installed during Stage 1
may not be sufficient to meet Stage 3 criteria. This could require significant financial
requirements to meet the new standards. HITECH and the Omnibus Final Rule have added to
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the financial upfront amounts by requiring expanded IT costs (security needs, system
maintenance, software upgrades), legal costs (counsel, consultations), and manpower costs
(update policy and procedures, privacy officer status, risk assessments) (McMillan, 2015).
These costs are critical to understand as they affect the viability and potential profitability
of an organization. A study conducted by Khansa et al. (2012) found that there is a close
relationship between the announcement and implementation of HIPAA standards and the
fluctuation of a company’s stock prices. When looking at the time directly after an
announcement about a change in HIPAA requirements, there was a statistically significant
negative return on a traded company’s stock price (Khansa et al., 2012).
OCR Fines
Backend costs, those incurred due to a reportable breach of information can be just as
impactful to the financial viability of an organization. These costs may include internal
investigation, notification, OCR fines, loss of market share, damage to a brand, and potentially
lowered reimbursements (McMillan, 2015).
Follow-up on reported breaches by OCR is required under HIPAA, and OCR has handed
sanctions out. Since the inception of HITECH, the fines have been solely on instances where the
breach affected more than 500 individuals. As of January 2, 2013, they have imposed fines on
smaller breaches (Heubusch, 2011). On that date, the first settlement involving less than 500
patients occurred to the Hospice of North Idaho in the amount of $50,000 due to the theft of a
laptop. HHS publicly announced it through a press statement on their website (U.S. Department
of Health and Human Services, 2011b). Table 1 outlines the penalties for noncompliance.
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Table 1: Penalties for Noncompliance
Per Violation

Identical Violations / Per Year

$100

$25,000

Reasonable Cause

$1,000

$100,000

Willful Neglect-Corrected

$10,000

$250,000

Willful Neglect-Uncorrected

$50,000

$1,500,000

Unaware of Violation

Source: Modifications to HIPAA, 2013; Holloway & Fensholt, 2013
As Table 1 shows, the lowest penalty occurs when a healthcare facility is unaware of a
violation, and the fine is only $100 per violation. An example of this would be if a facility had
proper policies and procedures in place and the privacy breach occurred by an employee who
followed the policies and procedures and had a simple mistake like a misdialed fax number. The
penalties increase as the scale of the offense increases. The highest penalty is associated with
Willful Neglect – Uncorrected. One example here would be a healthcare facility that completely
disregards HIPAA Privacy and Security requirements with no policies and procedures, which
leads to a breach of information. Another example would be that an employee steals patient
information and sells it to a third party; the facility discovers the breach and does nothing to
correct or mitigate the cause.
HHS publishes a list of breaches involving 500 or more patients on their website, which
is accessible for anyone to see (Boerner, 2010). They have posted a list of notable breaches, as
well as the action the organization has taken and the sanctions imposed on them (Boerner, 2010).
Table 2 lists some examples.
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Table 2: Breach Examples Involving 500 or More Patients
Date

Organization

# Patients

Breach

Penalty

Leased copiers returned

$1,215,780

Affected
8/14/13

Affinity Health

344,579

Plan Inc.
7/11/13

Wellpoint Inc.

without wiping hard drives
612,402

Weakness in internet

$1,700.000

database
5/21/13

Idaho State

17,500

Incorrectly disabled firewall

$400,000

836

Untimely reporting of breach

$475,000

1670

Malware infection

$650,000

University
1/9/17

Presence Health

11/22/16 University of
Massachusetts
Source: U.S. HHS, 2017

As shown in Table 2, the number of patients affected by breaches can vary in range but
can be quite high. Affinity Health Plan, Inc. services healthcare plans for companies that provide
health insurance to their employees. Their breach, returning leased copiers without wiping hard
drives, was a common error many healthcare facilities made early on. Common knowledge in
the industry seemed to miss that there are hard drives on copy machines that have the ability to
store large amounts of scanned or copied data. Another example, Idaho State University, had a
security issue where their firewall had been incorrectly disabled leading to vulnerabilities in the
system of 17,500 patients (U.S. HHS, 2017).
Breach Costs
Costs associated with breaches are high. A study by the CSI Computer Crime and
Security Institute stated that the average cost to a company for a security breach is $234,000.
When factoring in the study performed by Kroll Fraud Solutions, which found that overall
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5,306,000 individuals have had their privacy information breached, the numbers add up very
quickly (Khansa et al., 2012).
Studies have shown the high costs associated with breaches. The Ponemon Institute
(2016) conducted a benchmark study, which estimated the cost of patient data breaches annually
for healthcare organizations at $6.2 billion. This study spans numerous years and is now on its
sixth iteration. The study also found that of organizations that responded, 90% experienced a
breach incident over the course of 2 years previous to the study and estimated cost to each
organization was more than $2 million (Ponemon, 2016). These figures have held steady across
all six iterations of this study, from 2010 to 2016 (Ponemon, 2012; 2013; 2014; 2015; 2016).
They also studied the economic impact of a single lost patient on the organization when
considering market share, which is an average lifetime value of $113,580 per patient (Ponemon,
2016). Further studies encompassing the entire market, not just healthcare; have addressed the
economic impact of data breaches on market value and shareholders, concluding that breaches
concerning confidential data have a negative impact (Campbell, Gordon, Loeb & Zhou, 2003;
Khansa & Liginlal, 2009; Andoh-Baidoo & Bryson, 2006; Andoh-Baidoo, Amoako-Gyampah, &
Osei-Bryson, 2010).
From all of this research, it is clear that back-end privacy costs may have a sizeable
financial effect on an organization. A breach of a patient’s information can be detrimental to an
organization as well through direct costs (penalties, lawsuits) and indirect costs such as lower
revenue due to decreased market share. The financial impact of both the front-end and back-end
costs on an organization could be substantial, possibly even fatal to a smaller organization.
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Economic Supply & Demand
Rice and Unruh (2016) stated that the concept of supply and demand is central to the
discussion of economics, where supply is the “amount of goods and services firms wish to sell at
alternative prices” and demand is “how many goods and services are purchased at alternative
prices” (p. 179; p. 59). The key factor stated by the authors is that supply and demand economic
reasoning only holds up under a truly competitive marketplace. The authors also state that many
have tried to impose these concepts onto the healthcare market in the United States without first
realizing that the healthcare market in the U.S. is not truly competitive in economic terms. Of
the 14 assumptions listed by Rice and Unruh that are required for a truly competitive market, the
healthcare field meets few (2016).
Squire and Anderson (2015) found that the United States, as a nation, spends a great deal
on healthcare, more so than other industrialized nations. The authors also found that in 2013,
17.1% of the gross domestic product (GDP) was spent on healthcare services with a per person
average of $9,086. There are significant pushes to decrease the cost of healthcare as the high
rate of spending has not led to better outcomes (Squires & Anderson, 2015). Cost cutting can
come from a variety of avenues, and one significant area is reimbursement to medical facilities
as they can conform through competitive market methods. However, as healthcare does not hold
true to a competitive marketplace, this thinking can lead to dangerous consequences in patient
care including the potential to jeopardize patient privacy.
If privacy is a good, and the healthcare market was truly competitive, patients would be
able to demand privacy. If the facility does not supply privacy, meaning they suffered breaches
and violated HIPAA rules and regulations, the patients would then be able to take their business
27

elsewhere. However, we have already stated that healthcare is not a truly competitive market, so
what drives privacy adoptions among healthcare facilities? While there are federal rules and
penalties associated with breaking them, are they enough to offset the lack of market
responsiveness?
Do patients’ make a choice among their healthcare facilities? This is an important
question because if they are unable to purchase from another facility, does the original facility
have any impetus to provide the good the patient is seeking. With the high upfront costs and the
need to perform cost-cutting measures, healthcare facilities may not wish to fund privacy
measures and deal strictly with the back-end breach costs, especially if it may not hurt their
market share. Healthcare facilities may also choose not to report a breach since the law does
leave certain decisions to the discretion of the facility to avoid the back-end costs of the breach.
According to economists, demand is the key factor in a truly competitive marketplace (Rice &
Unruh, 2016). However, demand may be the key factor missing to make healthcare facilities
enact required privacy measures.
Patient Harm
The critical concerns for privacy breaches in healthcare are the detrimental effects for the
patient, which can range from simple financial fraud, to blackmail, to medical identity fraud. In
order to understand the magnitude of this issue, we must first understand why a patient having
his/her privacy information breached is harmful.
Massive breaches that occur in other industries can provide prime examples. The media
widely covered the Target breach. Hackers were able to access data on the credit cards of 40
million customers. The hackers may have accessed the personal information on upwards of 60
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million individuals (Dezenhall, 2015). Over the next six months, other large retailers suffered
breaches including Home Depot and JP Morgan Chase (Kerr, DeAngelis, & Brown, 2014). In
these cases, the type of information accessed is mainly financial (Korolov, 2015). Individuals
may have their credit card numbers used for false purchases and cash withdrawals leading to
financial instability (Korolov, 2015; Martin, Borah, & Palmatier, 2017)
In an article by Greene (2015), cases like the Target breach where financial and
demographic information was breached, significant harm comes from identity theft. Greene also
stated that this differs with information stolen from a healthcare entity, which could include
everything necessary to complete an identity-theft kit but with more harmful life-jeopardizing
possibilities. With information including social security numbers, employment information, and
birth dates, an unauthorized user can continually open new lines of credit instead of accessing
just one account or one credit card (Greene, 2015).
Medical records contain extremely sensitive information (Liginlal et al., 2012). This
information includes financial data as in the case of Target, but also social security numbers,
demographic information, and clinical information including medical diagnoses and treatment
plans (Liginlal et al., 2012).
A breach in this area can leave an individual vulnerable to a single unauthorized user, and
even possibly to the world depending on how that information is used. Not only do victims need
to worry about monitoring their financial statements, but they must also brace for a potentially
more harmful fallout from their medical information made public or used against them (Liginlal
et al., 2012).
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Another potentially harmful effect to the patient is that of insurance fraud and medical
identity theft (Korolov, 2015; Federal Trade Commission, 2010). The unauthorized user can
expend the patient’s available services leaving the patient having to pay out of pocket for critical
health care needs (Korolov, 2015). This often occurs with prescription medications (Korolov,
2015). The unauthorized user can also receive treatment, which ends up on the patient’s record
as the patient’s history (Korolov, 2015; Amori, 2008). When the patient attempts to receive
medical services, the unauthorized user’s treatment is intertwined with the patient’s previous
medical history (Korolov, 2015). The patient may also receive large medical bills for procedures
and treatments incurred by the unauthorized user leading to financial loss (Amori, 2008).
Technology is advancing at a rapid pace, but it is essential to stop and consider the effects
these advances might have on patients. Genetic information provides a wealth of knowledge and
is extremely valuable for research purposes which is why it is a popular type of data for crowdsourcing discoveries. Some studies have shown this type of data can be re-identified, and once
available online can become immune to redaction attempts, this can be especially true in cases of
genetic information with Direct to Consumer testing providers like 23andME and Ancestry.com
(Zarate, Brody, Brown, Ramirez-Andreotta, Perovich, and Matz, 2016; Brase, 2018; Erlich,
Shor, Carmi, & Pe’er, 2018). Other types of technological advances of concern are the
implications of facial and radiological images (Parks & Monson, 2016) and health information
exchange participation (Grando, Murck, Mahankali, Saks, Zent, Chern, Dye, Sharp, Young,
Davis, Hiestand, and Hassanzadeh, 2017).
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Prospect Theory & Privacy Breaches
This section provides the history and background of Prospect Theory and then discusses
how Privacy Officers as agents of healthcare facilities can apply it to the problem of breach
determination.
Prospect theory is a robust evolving theory that has many implications for management
and healthcare. The theory evolved throughout the last 300 years from the concept of utility to
Risk Theory to Prospect Theory, and some have even accepted a further iteration, Cumulative
Prospect Theory (Tversky & Kahneman, 1992). In order to apply Prospect Theory, we must first
understand its concepts, the possibilities, building blocks, constructs, and the relationship among
these elements (Jaccard & Jacoby, 2010).
It is important to note that while the constructs have compounded upon each other, each
one is still a crucial part of what we consider current day Prospect Theory. Throughout the years
the research has built upon the exiting foundation, keeping the original constructs and adding
new ones with each iteration. Prospect Theory has the following constructs of concepts listed in
Table 3.
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Table 3: Prospect Theory Overview
Construct

Definition

Utility

Satisfaction level

Diminishing Marginal Utility

As item increases, utility of increase diminishes

Risk Behavior

Risk averse, risk neutral, risk seeking

Reference Point

Individual’s status on …[a] commodity

Value Function

In terms of gains= risk averse; In terms of loss= risk seeking

Weighting

Overweigh (w+, small probabilities) and
Underweight (w-, large probabilities)

Framing

View of outcome will determine willingness to take risk
dependent on value function

Loss Aversion

People prefer to avoid a loss rather than have a gain

Source: Arrow, 1971; Briggs 2015; Bernoulli, 1738; Kahneman & Tversky, 1979; Tversky &
Kahneman, 1991
In Table 3, the theory terminology used for each construct has an applicable definition.
Each construct utilizes its original authors’ theory. The next section moves through the iterations
of theory that led to modern-day Prospect Theory highlighting the constructs listed in Table 3
Risk
Prospect Theory can be traced back to the 1700s. In 1738, Daniel Bernoulli published a
paper detailing The Measurement of Risk in which he used statistical principals to describe a way
to measure risk without taking individual factors into account, rather than just the probability of
an event occurring. Bernoulli identified the first construct of what we consider modern day
Prospect Theory, utility. Utility indicates satisfaction levels. An individual will take a risk in
32

proportion to their utility from the outcome, their satisfaction level with the chance of gain,
rather than taking into account the proportion that the gain will occur (Bernoulli, 1738).
Diminishing Marginal Utility
The theory continued to evolve when Alfred Marshall addressed it in his book Principles
of Economics (1890). He found that additional increments of an outcome increase utility.
However, utility does not increase at a consistent rate. The further removed from the initial
reference point, meaning the more one has of something, the increase in utility diminishes
(Marshall, 1890; Holmes et al., 2011). This is the second construct of Prospect Theory,
diminishing marginal utility (Marshall, 1890).
A simple illustration of this is money. A person starting at $0 who gains $100 will have
high utility. As they continue to gain in $100 increments, the utility they derive lessens. Thus,
when the individual has $100,000, adding an additional $100 does not hold the same value of
utility as when they had $0.
Risk Aversion Theory
In the 1960s, John Pratt (1964) and Kenneth Arrow (1971) developed a theory for what
had been building to that point, Risk Aversion Theory or, in some research, Expected-Utility
Theory. The theory builds upon previous works by including a classification among individuals
regarding their willingness to accept risk, which is the third construct under Prospect Theory,
risk behavior (Arrow, 1971). Individuals fall into one of three categories, risk averse, risk
neutral, and risk seeking (Pratt, 1964; Arrow, 1971). In an individual who is risk averse, all the
characteristics that were determined before hold true including diminishing marginal utility as
gains increase (Pratt, 1964; Arrow, 1971). In an individual who is risk neutral, risk will make no
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difference in their decision. In an individual who is risk seeking, they gain greater marginal
utility with the chance of risk and as their overall wealth increases (Arrow, 1971).
In Figure 1, graphs A, B, and C show the pattern of behavior based on our fourth
construct, expected utility. Dependent on the viewpoint of the individual on risk, the expected
utility, or prospective level of satisfaction, changes (Arrow, 1971).

Figure 1: Risk Premium
Source: Qniemiec, used under CCO 1.0/Combined graphs
Evolution to Prospect Theory
Daniel Kahneman and Amos Tversky (1979), built upon existing risk aversion theory to
create their seminal article Prospect Theory: An analysis of decisions under risk. They postulated
that a value function is necessary as a person will use a reference point to evaluate the outcomes
that are possible. Up until this point, the authors stated that it was determined that an individual
would decide whether or not to take a risk based only on the amount of utility they would get
from the outcome in regard to their overall wealth. With reference points, it was determined that
the individual would make a decision based on the value of either gains or losses from the risk
34

“relative to some neutral reference point” (Kahneman & Tversky, 1979, p. 274). This influences
Research Questions 1 and 2:
RQ1: Does the Privacy Officers’ reference point based on knowledge levels affect their choice
to report a breach of patient information?
RQ2: Does the Privacy Officers’ reference points based on past reporting affect their choice to
report a breach of patient information?
Kahneman and Tversky (1979) and Prospect theory brought the concept of loss into
theory, no longer just determining risk based on the gain but also where loss was concerned. The
authors stated that when individuals make decisions concerning both, the central graphs of risk
aversion and risk seeking hold true but add together. The value function stipulates that when
evaluating gains, a person is risk averse and when evaluating losses, a person is risk seeking
(Kahneman & Tversky, 1979). The new graphical representation of this is in Figure 2. The risk
averse behavior is on the upper right quadrant, and the risk seeking behavior is in the lower left
quadrant.

Figure 2: Hypothetical Value Function
Source: Kahneman & Tversky, 1979
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Prospect theory included what Bernoulli had established in the 1700s and compounded
upon it, that individuals do not use the actual probability of the risk when considering it
(Bernoulli, 1738). Probability of a risk outside of absolutes, 0% or 100%, is not aligned with the
decision weights given by individuals (Kahneman & Tversky, 1979; Holmes et al., 2011). As
illustrated in Figure 3, individuals tend to overweight (in very small probabilities) and
underweight (in large probabilities) the actual probability of their choices when deciding whether
to take the risk (Kahneman & Tversky, 1979).

Figure 3: Probability Weighting
Source: Kahneman & Tversky, 1979
Another fundamental change from established risk aversion theory was the inclusion of
framing. Kahneman and Tversky (1979) used the concept of framing to explain that the way an
individual views the outcome of risk will determine their willingness to take the risk dependent
on the S-shaped curve shown in Figure 2. The authors found that one person may view the
outcome as a gain, which means the likelihood of the individual taking the risk falls on the risk
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averse concave curve. However, another person may view the outcome as a loss, which then
will lead to the likelihood of the individual taking the risk to fall on the risk seeking convex
curve (Kahneman & Tversky, 1979). This influences Research Question 3:
RQ3: Does the framing of a scenario affect Privacy Officers’ choice to report a breach of
information?
Loss Aversion
Not even a decade after Tversky and Kahneman (1991) began writing about Prospect
Theory they published another paper regarding the concept of loss aversion. This expanded
upon the inclusion of the loss function to create the S-shaped curve. The authors found that on
the loss side, the convex curve has a sharper steep in the beginning as opposed to the concave
curve on the gain side; this is to simulate that a person will feel a loss ‘harder’ than a gain. Even
though it has a steep downward projection in the beginning, the authors stated that the loss
functions the same as a gain in that it has diminishing sensitivity. Just as utility plateaus for an
individual’s gain, so does the hurt from a loss (Tversky & Kahneman, 1991).
Cumulative Prospect Theory
A decade after their 1979 seminal article, and only one year after their loss aversion
paper, Tversky and Kahneman (1992) were able to build upon their original model and released
Advances in prospect theory: Cumulative representation of uncertainty, which detailed
Cumulative Prospect Theory. The authors stated that the main difference between these two
works is that when individuals are regarding the probabilities (and likely underweighting and
overweighing them) they view these differently based on whether the risk is seen from a gain or
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a loss perspective. In Prospect Theory, an individual will view the probability the same no
matter the framing as a gain or a loss (Tversky & Kahneman, 1992).
As can be seen in Figure 2, the straight line is the probability of a risk-neutral individual,
which means they do not distort the weights; they only view the actual probability (Tversky &
Kahneman, 1992). The w+ line shows that someone viewing the risk as a gain will overweigh a
low probability even more than someone viewing the risk as a loss. These same people from a
gain perspective will underweight a high probability even more than someone from a loss
perspective (Tversky & Kahneman, 1992).

Figure 4 Weighting Functions for Gains (w+) and Losses (w-)
Source: Tversky & Kahneman, 1992
Another difference that occurs between the two theories deals mostly with the
mathematics. When creating the equation for Prospect Theory the value of the gamble is a
function of two outcomes, whereas in Cumulative Prospect Theory the value of the gamble
“applies to any finite [gamble]” no matter the number of outcomes provided (Tversky &
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Kahneman, 1992). This is important to note, as one must consider the amount of times the
outcome of a risk is only a loss or a gain. Many times, it will be a combination or multiplication
of the two.
Weaknesses of Prospect Theory
The changes as theory evolves may seem minute when discussing the content of the
theory, but in the mathematical portion they make a significant difference. However, due to the
seemingly minute changes, many researchers use the terms Prospect Theory and Cumulative
Prospect Theory interchangeably, as they are accepted theories at this point. Many articles do
not mention cumulative, especially if they are not formulating the actual equations and are only
using the conceptual portion of the theory as will be the case in this study.
Another area of weakness when using Prospect Theory is that as it is highly mathematical
with origins in economics, researchers may find it difficult to apply to social research without a
mathematician. This could deter the application of Prospect Theory to multiple settings where it
could prove useful. Its concepts, outlined later, are applicable to understand decision-making
concerning risk in a general sense. While multiple types of settings have applied the theory, one
specific study referenced a need for further research of message framing with uncertain
outcomes (Evangeli, Kafaar, Kagee, Swartz, & Bullemor-Day, 2013).
Conceptual Map
The ten constructs listed in Table 3 together form Prospect Theory. Each piece builds
upon the piece before. Utility is the starting point, where an individual moves through the list of
the following constructs and choices begin to take shape. The process of placing constructs into a
map converts the conceptual system into a symbolic expression and provides theory construction
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(Jaccard & Jacoby, 2010). This signifies statements about the relationships between the
concepts/constructs (Jaccard & Jacoby, 2010). The Prospect Theory conceptual map is in Figure
5.

Figure 5: Prospect Theory Conceptual Map
An individual’s reference point is his/her starting view for the process. Framing is a
factor of choice presentation. To begin, prospects (choices) are presented. Both the frame and
reference influence how the view of the prospects and what their value functions are. The value
function of the choice determines the risk behavior used. The risk behavior influences the use of
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loss aversion and the diminishing marginal utility of the choice. These two impact the expected
utility of the prospects. The individual’s weighting of the probabilities impacts the expected
utility as well. From the expected utility, the individual will then make a choice. The choice
individuals make then affect their new reference point for all future prospects. This conceptual
map provides the basis for the choice of variables used for the study.
As the theory has been broken down into its concepts and constructs, its evolution, and
can now visually map it, it is possible to evaluate it to see if it fits the standard of a good theory.
This is crucial to determine if it is appropriate to utilize the theory for further academic research.
To evaluate Prospect Theory, it will be compared against several criteria outlined by Daniel
McCool in The Public Policy Theory Primer (Smith & Larimer, 2013) and by Jaccard and
Jacoby in Theory Construction and Model-Building Skills: A Practical Guide for Social
Scientists (2010).
Not all criteria listed by McCool and Jaccard and Jacoby will be used, as McCool stated
that it is highly unlikely that a theory will contain every aspect. It places an undue burden on the
theory to expect it to meet all the criteria listed, so if it does fall short on some points, it would
not necessarily cause immediate dismissal (Smith & Larimer, 2013). Table 4 evaluates Prospect
Theory.
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Table 4: Evaluation of Prospect Theory
Criteria

Further Definition

Utility/Validity

Accurate representation and guide of reality

Logically consistent

Not contradictory

Scope

Encompasses a large range

Testability

Provides hypotheses

Organization/Understanding

Imposes order

Heuristic

Provides future research

Predictiveness

Model for prediction

Relevance/Usefulness

Novel insight

Reliability

Supports replication

(Smith & Larimer, 2013; Jaccard & Jacoby, 2010, p. 31-32)
The theory meets all of the criteria mentioned in Table 2. Of most importance is that the
theory has utility and validity. Given the types of social problems we can address with this
theory it meets this criterion. Prospect Theory also provides usable hypotheses which many
researchers list as a major criterion of a good theory, especially as there are no overarching
public policy theories that currently can satisfy this need (Smith & Larimer, 2013, p. 30).
Therefore, when adopting theories from other fields to public policy issues, these two criteria are
of great priority.

42

Management/Healthcare Applications
Max Bazerman (1984) found a correlation between Prospect Theory and organizations.
All of the information provided previously has centered on how an individual would analyze risk
and make a personal decision. However, many are taking the concepts provided in these theories
and applying them to the business and healthcare fields. Bazerman (1984) made this jump and
wrote about Prospect Theory, particularly the concept of framing, and how it can explain aspects
of organizational behavior.
Holmes, Bomiley, Devers, Holcomb, and McGuire (2011) concentrated on the key
concepts behind utility, risk aversion, prospect, and Cumulative Prospect Theory. The authors
applied Prospect Theory to management concepts. They provided examples of executive
compensation, negotiations, affect and motivation, and human resources management (Holmes et
al., 2011). Some of these topics synthesized what was in earlier research, the impact of reference
points and framing in decision-making and pay scales. They also showcased higher-level
concepts that are organization level issues, organizational risk and return as well as firm risktaking behaviors.
While this study will focus on how individual Privacy Officers make decisions regarding
breach notification, it is important to understand their position as an agent of an organization.
While an organization itself may not make decisions, individuals are making these decisions on
behalf of the organization. Just as Bazerman found that Prospect Theory could apply to
organizations, so too does it apply to Privacy Officers making decisions on behalf of healthcare
facilities.
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Privacy Breaches Illustrated with Prospect Theory
Federal policy must be clear and useful in order to guide organizations. Without clear
guidance, healthcare facilities may view ambiguous language from their perspective, which
could affect their behavior. If the behavior in response to a privacy breach is not appropriate, the
patient’s information is at risk, which can lead to serious financial, emotional and physical harm.
This research focuses on the use of Prospect Theory to understand how Privacy Officers, as
agents of healthcare organizations, act regarding breaches of patient information that are not
clearly definable by the existing federal policy. This study adds to the body of knowledge as
there are no previous studies that have applied Prospect Theory to decisions regarding healthcare
privacy.
The scenario presented concerns privacy risks as determined by an individual Privacy
Officer of a healthcare organization. Healthcare privacy can utilize the model presented in
Figure 3 in many ways; however, the language ambiguity of the Breach Law will be the focus.
In this case, the hypothetical facility has endured a breach. The prospects (choices) are the
classification of the breach.
The reference point for a Privacy Officer begins with knowledge about the privacy laws
and the status of having experienced a prior breach. The prospects are to report the breach or not
to report the breach in accordance with HIPAA and the Omnibus Final Rule. The language from
the Omnibus Final Rule states facilities must “assume harm” unless they can prove otherwise
which makes the default choice to report. The Privacy Officer then uses the reference point to
frame the prospects as a gain or a loss.
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For example, in scenario A shown in Figure 6, a Privacy Officer has experienced a
reportable breach before, and he/she knows the monetary consequences and harm to the
reputation, so the value function is ‘reporting’ is a loss and ‘not reporting’ is a gain. The value
function assigned is dependent on the organizations’ reference point and framing.

Figure 6: Prospect Theory Scenario ‘A’ Concept Map
Now that the Privacy Officer has determined reporting a breach is a loss he/she falls into
the risk seeking behavior category. This triggers loss aversion; the Privacy Officer sees
reporting a breach as a loss so he/she will do what is necessary to keep that from occurring. It
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also affects the way diminishing marginal utility plays a role. A loss may be extremely hurtful,
but if they keep experiencing a loss, the impact of each loss decreases.
The viewpoint of the risk from both the loss aversion and diminished marginal utility
aspects then influence the expected utility of the choices. This is the utility the Privacy Officer
will feel from the different prospects available given both those aspects. The Privacy Officer
will also weigh the probabilities differently for the two prospects given his/her framing of them.
If reporting is a loss, even though it might seem like a small probability that there might be a
loss, the individual will tend to overweigh and inflate the probability in his/her mind. With the
expected utility of each prospect now available with all the influences given, the organization
can make what they deem the best choice. It could be the opposite, as shown in scenario B in
Figure 7; an organization did not have a prior breach so ‘reporting’ is not a gain or a loss.
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Figure 7: Prospect Theory Scenario ‘B’ Concept Map
A third option in Figure 8 is scenario 8, showcases an organization with a prior breach,
which did not report, was audited and fined for failure to report. In this scenario, ‘not reporting’
is a loss and ‘reporting’ is a gain.
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Figure 8: Prospect Theory Scenario ‘C’ Concept Map
The use of Prospect Theory in healthcare research is still relatively new. Individual
behavior has used the theory for quite some time; however, its implications to
management/healthcare analysis are wide open. This theoretical framework will help explain a
Privacy Officer’s view of the risk of potential privacy breaches which will then, in turn, lead to
predicting the actions taken to report or not report. With the policy language open to
interpretation, it places the impetus for action on the organization through their Privacy Officers,
and each Officer may behave differently dependent on their experiences.
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CHAPTER 3: METHODOLOGY
The following chapter outlines the research questions and hypotheses addressed by this
study, discusses the research design and sampling method including data collection and
measurement, and explains the data analysis methodology. To provide clarification regarding
the specific variables studied and the methodology used for data analysis, the chapter
organization is as follows: research questions and hypotheses; research design, sampling and
measurement; data collection and analysis, and finally the ethics of the study.
Research Questions and Hypotheses
RQ1: Does the Privacy Officers’ reference point based on knowledge levels affect their choice
to report a breach of patient information?
H1: Higher percentage of years employed in the healthcare field is positively associated with
reporting future indefinable breaches of healthcare information in a general scenario.
H2: Higher percentage of years employed in the healthcare field is positively associated with
reporting future indefinable breaches of healthcare information in a gain scenario.
H3: Higher percentage of years employed in the healthcare field is positively associated with
reporting future indefinable breaches of healthcare information in a loss scenario.

H4: Lower level of self-reported knowledge in healthcare privacy is negatively associated with
reporting future indefinable breaches of healthcare information in a general scenario.
H5: Lower level of self-reported knowledge in healthcare privacy is negatively associated with
reporting future indefinable breaches of healthcare information in a gain scenario.
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H6: Lower level of self-reported knowledge in healthcare privacy is negatively associated with
reporting future indefinable breaches of healthcare information in a loss scenario.

H7: Higher levels of education are positively associated with reporting future indefinable
breaches of healthcare information in a general scenario.
H8: Higher levels of education are positively associated with reporting future indefinable
breaches of healthcare information in a gain scenario.
H9: Higher levels of education are positively associated with reporting future indefinable
breaches of healthcare information in a loss scenario.

H10: Attainment of a Certified Healthcare Privacy and Security credential is positively
associated with reporting future indefinable breaches of healthcare information in a general
scenario.
H11: Attainment of a Certified Healthcare Privacy and Security credential is positively
associated with reporting future indefinable breaches of healthcare information in a gain
scenario.
H12: Attainment of a Certified Healthcare Privacy and Security credential is positively
associated with reporting future indefinable breaches of healthcare information in a loss scenario.

H13: Attainment of a Registered Health Information Administrator or Technician credential is
positively associated with reporting future indefinable breaches of healthcare information in a
general scenario.
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H14: Attainment of a Registered Health Information Administrator or Technician credential is
positively associated with reporting future indefinable breaches of healthcare information in a
gain scenario.
H15: Attainment of a Registered Health Information Administrator or Technician credential is
positively associated with reporting future indefinable breaches of healthcare information in a
loss scenario.

RQ2: Does the Privacy Officers’ reference points based on past reporting affect their choice to
report a breach of patient information?
H16: Prior reporting of a breach of healthcare information to the Office for Civil Rights is
positively associated with reporting future indefinable breaches of healthcare information in a
general scenario.
H17: Prior reporting of a breach of healthcare information to the Office for Civil Rights is
positively associated with reporting future indefinable breaches of healthcare information in a
gain scenario.
H18: Prior reporting of a breach of healthcare information to the Office for Civil Rights is
positively associated with reporting future indefinable breaches of healthcare information in a
loss scenario.

RQ3: Does the framing of a scenario affect Privacy Officers’ choice to report a breach of
information?

51

H19: A breach of healthcare information scenario framed as a gain is positively associated with
privacy officers classifying the breach as reportable to the Office for Civil Rights.
H20: A breach of healthcare information scenario framed as a loss is negatively associated with
privacy officers classifying the breach as reportable to the Office for Civil Rights.
Research Design
This study utilizes primary data through a research survey conducted over a single year
time period. As the study aims to gather data on a sample of a population at a single instance in
time, a non-experimental cross-sectional research design is used (Babbie, 2001). This type of
design is preferable due to feasibility and ethical restrictions (discussed later) that prevent
conduction of a true experimental study. The collection of primary data was necessary due to a
lack of prior research of this format and subject. Prior to data collection, the Institutional Review
Board at the University of Central Florida completed an initial review as well as a secondary
review of the follow-up email format.
This study design meets the criteria for internal validity, that the results are attributed to
the study and not flaws in the design or unaccounted-for factors. As the study utilizes a crosssectional design, maturation- as the sample ages they change, instrumentation- changes occur in
the measurement instrument during pre-and post-test, and experimental mortality- as the study
progresses individuals in the sample drop out, are not applicable. However, as a questionnaire
with multiple scenarios is being used, testing- the questions themselves bias the answers, and
experimenter-bias, could be valid threats to the study (Babbie, 2001). Steps were taken to
counteract this include the use of pilot testing and subject matter experts to review the
questionnaire.
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Survey questionnaires in the Privacy Officer and/or breach notification area are few and
not easily accessible. As there were not pre-screened surveys available it was necessary to
develop a new questionnaire.
Care was taken during the questionnaire development to identify issues that could lead to
threats to internal validity. When creating a questionnaire, bias or ambiguity in wording occurs.
Using an outside review team, such as a subject matter expert and a pilot study, helps bring
another point of view to help correct and clarify questions and format (Babbie, 2001). Pilot
study participants and a subject matter expert reviewed the questionnaire for ease of use by
survey participants and provided guidance on the scenarios. Extraneous and confounding
variables are of major concern, as the analysis will use logistic regression. After completion of
the analysis by the subject matter expert and pilot study, the feedback was reviewed to eliminate
threats; more discussion of this is located in the Analysis section. The survey questionnaire is
located in Appendix E.
Population & Sample
The population for this study is individual healthcare Privacy Officers affiliated with the
American Health Information Management Association (AHIMA). AHIMA is a national
organization that oversees the Health Information Management workforce in the United States
by credentialing and membership. AHIMA has taken the lead in HIPAA and Privacy as it is part
of the educational program-credentialing exams, as well as the focus of a specialized credential,
the Certified in Healthcare Privacy and Security (CHPS) (AHIMA, 2017).
The focus is placed on this population of individuals for this study as Privacy Officers are
required under HIPAA and are responsible for handling any breaches of health care information
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that occur within a facility. Affiliation with AHIMA is critical for access to knowledge and
resources as well as access to the study population.
To ensure that the sample is representative of the population, and due to the nature of the
population, a non-probability purposive sampling method is used. Therefore, sampling was
conducted based on specific characteristics (Babbie, 2001). The characteristics focused for this
study include AHIMA membership, listing in the AHIMA Engage directory, and Privacy
designation. AHIMA offers a networking site, Engage, which houses a member directory.
AHIMA automatically lists the members and classifies their information by their AHIMA
account profile. AHIMA members do self-select their information, including job category;
however, the information must be current and accurate for credentialing purposes.
The information from Engage is not a downloadable list, and due to size constraints,
searches of the list can only occur in small quantities, meaning only the first 200 results populate.
Therefore, an advanced search was conducted by state and by job level, which was limited to
Director (e.g., HIM IT)/Officer (e.g., Privacy). This was sufficient to limit the results per state to
under 200 individuals with the exception of seven states. These included California, Florida,
Illinois, New York, Pennsylvania, Tennessee, and Texas. A search by the initial letter of the last
name was performed to capture all individuals for these states. Individuals identified with
Privacy in their title were the only ones sent the survey questionnaire. Of note, Delaware was the
only state that did not have any individuals denoted by Privacy in their title. There were six
states with only one individual with a Privacy title identified. To ensure the anonymity of survey
respondents, aggregation of results occurred by “state healthcare privacy notification law status.”
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A breakdown of the number of AHIMA members listed as Director and with a Privacy
designation is located in Appendix H.
Measurement
Using individual Privacy Officers as the unit of analysis and the methods outlined above,
surveys were distributed. Reliability and validity of the study are paramount, and multiple
methods satisfied the four cornerstones of a quality survey as listed by Dillman, Smyth,
Christian, and Melani (2014). These include: (1) coverage error – the sample does not represent
the population for estimation purposes; (2) sampling error – the estimate produced by the sample
is different from an estimate produced by the population; (3) nonresponse error – there is a
difference in the results from the group that responded and if all of those sampled responded; and
(4) measurement error – the respondents provided inaccurate responses through inability or
unwillingness due to survey design (Dillman et al., 2014).
To account for coverage error, a narrowing of the study’s population occurred. To
account for sampling error, all members of the identified population were asked to participate.
The request for participation was structured to attract all participants, which accounts, as much as
possible, for nonresponse error. Development of the questionnaire occurred through discussions
with the committee and members of the healthcare privacy community. A subject matter expert
reviewed the questionnaire for ease of use by participants and appropriateness of scenarios. A
pilot study was conducted by submitting the questionnaire to volunteer individuals with
healthcare privacy experience to account for measurement error. The individuals invited to
participate accessed the Qualtrics survey to account for the entire experience that survey
respondents would have. An additional question at the end of the survey asked “Feedback:
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Comments/Concerns on Questions – For Pilot Study." Feedback from pilot study participants is
located in Appendix J.
Questions use the guidelines listed for closed-ended questions provided by Dillman et al.
(2014). Areas of concern in question design that were addressed include positive and negative
stems, category lists include all possible reasonable answers, mutual exclusivity present in lists,
appropriate answer spaces dependent on question’s intent, multiple choice or forced-question
formats used where appropriate, and scale design (Dillman et al., 2014).
Data Collection
To determine the feasibility of this study, an initial examination of the ability to obtain
contacts for survey distribution occurred. A review of the AHIMA Engage Directory proved
time-consuming but achievable. An initial listing by state showed 5293 individuals with the
Director/Officer classification, and of those 479 individuals had Privacy in their title.
A trial run of the messaging system within Engage was successful. Messages sent
through the Engage system send an email to the individual’s desired email address and includes
the full copy of the text and functioning HTML links. This was tested to make sure that there
were no additional steps or logins required in order for individuals to access the information for
the study, or the link for the survey, which might hinder response rates. The system provides all
the necessary information to the potential participants in an easily read, seamless manner. The
most considerable burden was on the researcher sending out the messages as it was on an
individual level, but it was feasible within a reasonable timeframe.
Identified AHIMA members were contacted by messaging through the Engage site. This
required selection of a ‘send message’ box which opened up a new window where a “subject”
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area was required to be filled in, as well as a “message” area. The process was repeated at an
individual level for all 479 identified Privacy Officers.
Data collection utilized the University of Central Florida Qualtrics online survey tool.
The message included a bitly link to the Qualtrics survey for ease of use and understanding. This
minimized costs associated with this portion of the research. In order to reach a sufficient sample
size, follow-up was necessary through the AHIMA Engage site as well with targeted emails.
The initial email was sent on a Tuesday, a first reminder email was sent two weeks later, and a
final reminder email was sent one week later. With a margin of error of 8%, a significance
(alpha) level of 0.05, and a population of 479, the minimum sample size required is 115
individual responses (Raosoft, 2017). This minimum sample size enables strong conclusions and
generalizability of the results (Gogtay, 2010).
The initial survey request received 85 responses from participants. As the minimum
sample size required by the power analysis was 115, a follow-up was sent two weeks after the
original request. From that, there were an additional 57 responses which brought the total to
142. However, an initial review of the data showed 27 responses were ineligible for the study.
One final request for participation the following week resulted in 170 responses, resulting in an
appropriate sample size for robust analyses (Dillman et al., 2014).
Data Analysis
Univariate, bivariate, multivariate and post regression statistics characterized the data to
address the research questions and hypotheses. For research questions one and two, there are
three dependent variables which use multivariate logistic regression, therefore three separate
models tested the hypotheses. Post regression testing of the logistic regression models yielded
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predicted probabilities. For research question three, chi-square tests analyzed the hypotheses.
This section includes the analysis methodology for each set of models, the formula, the
corresponding research questions and hypotheses, and finally the operationalization of variables
table specific to those models.
For all regression models, the control and independent variables remained the same. The
variables that occurred across all three models are control (Age, Gender, Department, State
Laws, Facility Classification, and Profit Status) and independent (Years HC, Years HC Privacy,
Education Level, Credentials, Knowledge Level, Prior Breach Status, Breach Number, Breach
Effects). The three dependent variables are General Breach Scenario, Gain Breach Scenario, and
Loss Breach Scenario.
Multivariate Analyses of Breach Reporting
Logistic regression analyzed the effect that multiple independent variables, both
categorical and continuous, have on a single dependent categorical variable. This assesses the
hypotheses about factors associated with reporting a breach of PHI to OCR in multiple scenarios.
The general assumption required is a lack of multicollinearity, that the independent variables will
not be correlated (Pallant, 2013). This will be determined using the Tolerance Factors and the
Variance Inflation Factors (Pallant, 2013). To ensure a lack of multicollinearity, a test for
correlation occurred. Chi-square analyses examined the relationship between the variables at an
individual level. There are three separate multivariate logistic regression models, but all use the
following model:
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log 𝑦 =∝ +𝛽𝑖 𝑥𝑖

where:

∝= Constant
𝛽= Regression Coefficient
𝑥𝑖 Stands for the following variables, both independent and control:
The research questions and hypotheses that are addressed with the multivariate logistic
regression tests are as follows:
RQ1: Does the Privacy Officers’ reference point based on knowledge levels affect their choice
to report a breach of patient information?
Hypotheses H1-H15
RQ2: Does the Privacy Officers’ reference points based on past reporting affect their choice to
report a breach of patient information?
Hypotheses H16 – H18
The operationalization of the variables for the multivariate logistic regression are shown
in Table 5 and Table 6.
Table 5: Operationalization of Dependent Variables
Variable

Variable
Type

General
Breach
Scenario
Gain
Breach
Scenario
Loss
Breach
Scenario

Variable
Classification

Measure

Source

Dependent Categorical

Not Report=0
Report=1

Survey

Self-choice to report future
ambiguous breaches to OCR

Dependent Categorical

Not Report=0
Report=1

Survey

Self-choice to report gain framed
ambiguous breach to OCR

Dependent Categorical

Not Report=0
Report=1

Survey

Self-choice to report loss framed
ambiguous breach to OCR
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Definition

Table 6: Operationalization of Independent and Control Variables
Variable

Variable
Type

Variable
Classification

Measure

Source

Definition

Years HC

Independent Continuous

Number

Survey

Years HC
Privacy
Knowledge
Level

Independent Continuous

Number

Survey

Independent Categorical

Survey

Prior
Breach
Status
Profit
Status

Independent Categorical

Excellent=1
Above Average=2
Average = 3
Below Average=4
Poor=5
No=0
Yes=1

Survey

Reported a prior breach

Independent Categorical

Non-Profit= 1
For-Profit = 2

Survey

Education
Level

Independent Categorical

High School=1
Associates=2
Bachelors=3
Masters=4
Doctoral=5

Survey

Facility of employment profit
status as either non-profit or
for-profit
Highest level of education
completed

Credential

Independent Categorical

Survey

All AHIMA credentials held
by participant

Facility
Type

Control

RHIA=1
RHIT=2
CCA=3
CCS=4
CCSP=5
CDIP=6
CHDA=7
CHPS=8
CHTS=9
CPHI=10
Acute Care=1
IHDS=2
Ambulatory = 3
Behavioral =4
Physician
Practice=5
Consultant=6
Education=7
HIE=8
Home Health=9
Long Term=10
Non-Provider=11

Survey

Facility of employment type

Categorical
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Years working in healthcare
field
Years working in healthcare
privacy field
Self-rating on healthcare
privacy knowledge level

Variable

Gender

Variable
Type

Variable
Classification

Control

Categorical

Age
Control
Department Control

Continuous
Categorical

State Laws

Categorical

Control

Measure
Other= 12
REC=13
Male=1
Female= 2
Prefer not to
disclose=3
Other=4
Number
Executive = 1
HIM Staff = 2
IT Staff = 3
Joint=4
Other=5
No=0
Yes=1

Source

Definition

Survey

Gender

Survey
Survey

Age
Role in healthcare current
position falls under

Survey

Presence of additional state
breach reporting laws

Bivariate Analyses of Framing Effects
A comparison of the three breach scenario questions showcased the impact that framing
of a scenario has on the decision an individual privacy officer makes for breach notification
determination, see Table 5 for the variables used. A chi-square test for independence was used
to analyze the relationship between two categorical variables and to test the differences between
these two independent groups using a significance level of 0.05 (Pallant, 2013; Hazra & Gogtay,
2016). A comparison was made of the General Breach Scenario variable against the Gain
Breach Scenario variable and then compared against the Loss Breach Scenario variable. The
general assumption required is that all cells in the output should have a frequency greater than or
equal to five or in the case of a 2x2 table, greater than or equal to ten.

If that assumption is not

met, then Fisher’s Exact Probability Test is utilized (Pallant, 2013). There are two separate chisquare models, but both have the following format:
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𝑥2 = ∑ +

(𝑂−𝐸)2
𝐸

where:

𝑥 2 = chi-square obtained
∑ = sum of
𝑂= observed frequency
E = expected frequency

The research questions and hypotheses that are addressed with the bivariate chi-square
tests are as follows:
RQ3: Does the framing of a scenario affect Privacy Officers’ choice to report a breach of
information?
H19: A breach of healthcare information scenario framed as a gain is positively associated with
privacy officers classifying the breach as reportable to the Office for Civil Rights.
H20: A breach of healthcare information scenario framed as a loss is negatively associated with
privacy officers classifying the breach as reportable to the Office for Civil Rights.
Software
The analysis used SPSS and Stata software through a license with the University of
Central Florida. IBM SPSS Statistics 24 was used to run the descriptive analyses, correlation
and chi-square tests, and multiple logistic regression models. The post regression analyses were
run using Stata software.
Data Cleaning
Once the survey closed, a final review of the data was necessary to clean the data. Of the
170 responses, six respondents started the survey but did not answer a majority of questions, five
stated they were not employed, and five were not their facility’s Privacy Officer. Twenty of the
respondents did not answer one or more of the dependent variable questions and were removed.
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To ensure a clean data set, other responses were removed if they did not fully complete the
survey, including three for ‘Profit Status,’ one for ‘State Laws,’ one for ‘Years of healthcare
privacy experience,’ and six for ‘Age.’ This left a final of 123 survey responses which exceeded
the minimum sample size required.
A few responses had issues addressed during the review of the data. There was removal
of any ‘+’ sign (for example 20+) or words for the two variables dealing with ‘Years worked in
healthcare.’ An assumption would be that the ‘Number of years worked in healthcare privacy’
would be greater than or equal to the ‘Number of years worked in healthcare.’ Five responses
did not meet this assumption. To account for this and the individual’s response, there was a new
variable created by dividing the two previous variables. The new variable, ‘Percentage of years
worked in healthcare privacy’ represented the amount of their career in healthcare explicitly
worked in the privacy field.
The number of responses for the options under the categories for each variable
necessitated a few modifications to the original operationalization table so that they could run
accurately in the model. For ‘Education Level,’ High School and Associates Level combined, as
well as Masters and Doctoral Degree. For ‘Facility Classification,’ the highest proportion of
respondents fell into two categories, so all the remaining were combined to Other. For
‘Knowledge Level,’ there were no responses for Below Average or Poor. For ‘Gender,’ there
were no responses for Other.
The ‘Credential’ variable originally dedicated a number to each individual credential.
However, many study participants held multiple credentials, so these were broken out. The key
credentials after a review of the correlational table and demographics were RHIA/RHIT, Coding,
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and CHPS credentials. These were modified to dichotomous yes/no variables, and the
‘Credential’ variable was changed to a dichotomous yes/no as well, signifying presence of any
credential or not. As each of the individual types of credentials make up the overall ‘Credential’
variable as well, it was prudent to remove the ‘Credential’ variable in favor of the individual
types of credentials to ensure overlap did not occur.
The ‘Department’ variable showed an interesting result after reviewing the descriptive
data. Originally there were five categories, one being Other with a fill-in option. The Other
option was selected numerous times with a high number of write-ins for ‘Compliance.’ These
were parsed out with a new category of Compliance created, Executive kept as is, and the
remaining categories combined to HIM/IT/Other.
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Table 7: Updated Operationalization of Independent and Control Variables
Variable

Variable
Type

Variable
Classification

Measure

Source

Definition

% Years HC Independent Continuous
Privacy

Number

Survey

Knowledge
Level

Independent Categorical

Survey

Prior
Breach
Status
Profit Status

Independent Categorical

Excellent=1
Above Average=2
Average = 3
No=0
Yes=1

Survey

Reported a prior breach

Independent Categorical

Non-Profit= 1
For-Profit = 2

Survey

Education
Level

Independent Categorical

Survey

RHIA/RHIT
Credential
Coding
Credential
CHPS
Credential
Facility
Type

Independent Categorical

Control

Categorical

Gender

Control

Categorical

Age
Department

Control
Control

Continuous
Categorical

State Laws

Control

Categorical

HS/Assoc=1
Bachelors=2
Graduate=3
No=0
Yes=1
No=0
Yes=1
No=0
Yes=1
Acute Care=1
IHDS=2
Other= 3
Male=1
Female= 2
Prefer not to
disclose=3
Number
Executive = 1
HIM/IT/Other
Staff = 2
Compliance=3
No=0
Yes=1

Facility of employment
profit status as either nonprofit or for-profit
Highest level of education
completed

Independent Categorical
Independent Categorical

Survey

Percent of years working in
healthcare spent in privacy
field
Self-rating on healthcare
privacy knowledge level

Survey

Hold a RHIA and or RHIT
credential
Hold a coding credential

Survey

Hold a CHPS credential

Survey

Facility of employment type

Survey

Gender

Survey
Survey

Age
Role in healthcare current
position falls under

Survey

Presence of additional state
breach reporting laws

Ethics
This study has many ethical issues to take into consideration. IRB approval was required
before data collection began. The topic at hand, privacy breach reporting, was handled with the
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utmost care during measurement tool creation. Privacy breach reporting has the potential to be
detrimental to an organization as shown through the literature review, which could lead to a
reluctance from participants. A subject matter expert reviewed the survey and provided feedback
before use. To ensure the appropriateness of the questions, several individuals participated in a
pilot study. Lastly, all data collected is maintained with the standards required under the UCF
Institutional Review Board to ensure privacy protections.
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CHAPTER 4: RESULTS
This chapter covers the findings from the analysis detailed in Chapter 3. Descriptive and
bivariate statistical results are discussed. Finally the multivariate and post regression analyses
used to answer the research questions from this study are detailed by method of analysis.
Descriptive Statistics
Descriptive statistics show the breakdown of invited and participating individuals (Table
8) and their demographic information (Tables 9-13). This face validity check indicated the data
collected was representative of the population studied.
Table 8: Survey Requests and Participants

State with additional
healthcare privacy laws
State without additional
healthcare privacy laws
Total

Contacted

Participated

Disqualified

172 (36%)

48 (39%)

1

307 (64%)
479

75 (61%)
123 (25%)

4
5

After a review of the AHIMA Engage site, 479 individuals with a Privacy designation
within the United States were identified and contacted for participation. As shown in Table 8, of
those who participated in the survey, 39% were in a state with additional healthcare privacy laws
and 61% were in states without additional laws. This is comparable to the contacted population,
where it was 36% and 64% respectively. This is representative of the AHIMA population as a
whole as well, where they found 7.1% of their members were in the
Privacy/Security/Compliance area and this study found about 9% of the population had a Privacy
designation (479/5293) (Caviart Group, 2015). Appendix H provides details of this breakdown.
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Table 9: Privacy Officer/Facility Demographic Statistics
Mean
Age
Years employed in
healthcare
Years employed in
healthcare privacy

Std.
Dev.

Median

Mode

53.02

54

47a

8.50

72.17

45

27

72

26.76

28

30

10.90

118.81

45

1

46

12.55

12

15

7.21

52.02

39

1

40

0.07

0.97

0.03

1

3296.52

299

1

300

Percentage of
years worked in
0.49
0.45
1
0.26
healthcare privacy
Number of
breaches facility
34.2
12
1 57.42
reported to OCR
a. Multiple modes exist. The smallest value is shown

Variance

Range

Min.

Max.

As shown in Table 9, the average age of respondents was 53 years old with a standard
deviation of 8.5 years. The number of years they worked in healthcare was high, at close to 27
years. They also on average worked a significant amount of time in privacy, with the mean over
12 years. Many respondents worked a majority of their time in healthcare in the privacy field,
with the average being close to 50%. The average number of breaches was 34 with a large range
from 1-300 as expected when taking into account some respondents may have been from smaller
facilities and others from large systems.
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Table 10: Privacy Officer Demographics
Variable
Age

Gender
Education

Credentials

Department

Knowledge Level

% of Years worked in
Healthcare Privacy

Number
25-34
35-44
45-54
55-64
65+
Female
Male
High School
Associate Degree
Bachelor Degree
Master Degree
Doctoral Degree
Credentials (Y/N)
RHIA
RHIT
CCS/CSS-P
CHPS
CHTS
CPHI
CDIP
HIM Department
IT Department
Joint HIM/IT
Appointment
Compliance
Executive Team
Other
Excellent
Above Average
Average
1-24
25-49
50-74
75-99
100
69

%
4
13
49
52
5

3.3
10.6
39.8
42.3
4.1

113
10
2
23
57
37
4
110
46
27
9
18
1
1
1
59
3

91.9
8.1
1.6
18.7
46.3
30.1
3.3
89.4
37.4
22
7.3
14.6
0.8
0.8
0.8
48
2.4

5

4.1

21
26
9
47
60
16
22
51
27
9
14

17.1
21.1
7.3
38.2
48
13
17.6
40.8
21.7
7.2
11.4

The Privacy Officer specific demographics are shown in Table 10. The ages of the
Privacy Officer respondents fell in greater numbers in the 35-64 year old range, 92.7% which is
consistent with numbers from an AHIMA study which found 77.3% of their members fell within
the same range when taking into account their population of student members which were
ineligible for this study (Caviart Group, 2015). Gender was also consistent with the study from
AHIMA which showed a 91% to 9% ratio of women to men in comparison with this study which
was 92% to 8% (Caviart Group, 2015).
A large percentage of respondents held at least one credential, 89.4%. The highest
number had a RHIA which is a Bachelor’ Degree credential, although this did not line up with
the percentage of those who held that degree, 37.4% and 46.3%. This was the same for the
Associate’s level degree and credential, 18.7% and 22%. This was as expected since all those
who qualify do not necessarily sit for the credential. The other two credentials that stood out
were the coding credential category and the CHPS. Only 14.6% of those who responded held the
dedicated credential that best fits with the Privacy Officer position. Also of note, the majority of
the respondents had at least some level of higher education, with the majority graduating with a
Bachelor’s (46.3%) or Master’s degree (37%).
As stated previously, when running the statistics for the ‘Department’ classification
variable, the Other category held numerous write-ins for Compliance which necessitated the
creation of another category split from Other. Compliance was the third highest department with
17.1%, behind Executive with 21.1% and HIM Department with 48%. Respondents fell into
these three categories the majority of the time, accounting for over 86%. Write-in responses that
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remained in the Other category were Director of Revenue Cycle, Physician Practice, Information
Security, Patient Business Service, Quality, Risk Management and Corporate.
‘Knowledge Level’ was a self-reported variable that included five categories, Poor,
Below Average, Average, Above Average, and Excellent. No respondents classified themselves
as Below Average or Poor. The highest percentage self-rated as Above Average with 48%,
followed by Excellent with 38.2% and finally the least at Average with 13%.
Table 11: Privacy Officer Years Employed
In Healthcare
(Number)
1-9
10-19
20-29
30-39
40-50

10
18
39
39
17

In Healthcare
(%)
8
14.6
31.6
31.6
13.7

In Healthcare
Privacy (Number)
45
59
14
5
-

In Healthcare
Privacy (%)
36.4
48
11.4
4
-

As shown in Table 9, the survey respondents have spent an extended period of time in
healthcare on average. In Table 11, this is broken down further into year categories and shows
that over 63% of respondents have worked in healthcare between 20-39 years. The average time
spent in healthcare privacy was 12.5 years, and Table 11 shows that the higher percentages of
respondents have been in privacy less than 20 years. This is as expected as HIPAA was only
created in 1996 with a 2003 effective date, which was twenty years ago. The push for Privacy
Officers was not urgent until the 2009/2013 legislation as well. Table 10 also shows this, with
the majority of respondents having worked 50% or less of their healthcare career in the privacy
arena.
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Table 12: Facility Demographics
Facility Classification

State Privacy Laws
Profit Status

Acute Care Hospital
Ambulatory Surgery Center
Behavioral/Mental Health
Clinic/Physician Practice
Consulting Service
Education
Health Information Exchange
Home Health/Hospice
Integrated Healthcare Delivery System
Long Term Care
Non-Provider Setting (e.g., govt, vendor, assoc.)
Other Provider Setting (e.g., rehab)
Regional Extension Center
No
Yes
For-Profit
Non-Profit

Number
51
1
7
10
1
2
1
1
36
4
3
4
2
75
48
34
89

%
41.5
0.8
5.7
8.1
0.8
1.6
0.8
0.8
29.3
3.3
2.4
3.3
1.6
61
39
27.6
72.4

Respondents of the survey worked, by a majority, in an Acute Care Hospital, 41.5% as
shown in Table 12. The second highest category was an Integrated Healthcare Delivery System
with 29.3%. The other categories fell below 10% of respondents with each coming closer to 12%. This is somewhat in line with a study AHIMA did a few years ago where their sample came
in at about 52% for Acute Care, 9% with Integrated Systems, 8% for physician clinics, and under
10% for the other categories (AHIMA, 2010). More of the respondents worked for facilities that
had a Non-Profit status over For-Profit facilities (72% to 28% respectively).

72

Table 13: Breach Demographics
Number
39
84

%
31.7
68.3

Cases of Fewer than 500 patients per incident
and cases of More than 500 patients per incident

18

14.6

Fewer than 500 patients per incident ONLY

63

51.2

More than 500 patients per incident ONLY

3

2.4

23

18.7

1
60
75
48
33
90
10
113

0.8
48.8
61
39
26.8
73.2
8.1
91.9

Prior Breach

No
Yes

Breach
Classification

Breach
Consequences

General Scenario
(Dependent Var. 1)
Gain Scenario
(Dependent Var. 2)
Loss Scenario
(Dependent Var. 3)

Corrective Action Plan
Corrective Action Plan and OCR Fine
None
Not Report
Report
Not Report
Report
Not Report
Report

Overall the study found that the majority of respondents had reported a breach, 68.3%,
but not all. As shown in Table 13, For those that had reportable breaches, most respondents had
only cases that affected less than 500 patients per incident, and only three respondents had
exclusively cases that were major breaches that would have required media notification. Many
had no consequences from the reported breach and if they did it was a Corrective Action Plan
rather than fines.
The dependent variables were scenario-based; the first scenario was generic – if there is
an ambiguous breach in the future, with no further information, would they report? The majority
of respondents chose that they would Not Report, 61%. The second scenario, while still
ambiguous, included framing of the question with a gain perspective. It involved a case with
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paper records. The majority reversed in this case, with 73.2% choosing to Report. The last
scenario was still ambiguous, but had a loss frame and involved a ransomware attack. In this
case, an overwhelming majority chose to Report, 91.9%.
The demographics by scenario are showcased in Table 14.
Table 14: Demographics by Scenario

Gender

Male
Female
Education
High School
Associates Degree
Bachelor’s Degree
Master’s Degree
Doctoral Degree
Credentials
No
Yes
Department
Executive
HIM/IT/Joint
Staff/Other
Compliance
Knowledge
Excellent
Above Average
Average
Age
Mean
PercYrsWrkd Mean

General Gain
Scenario Scenario
(yes)
(yes)
20%
80%
41%
67%
50%
100%
48%
96%
40%
77%
27%
51%
75%
75%
69%
69%
35%
74%
38%
73%
38%
75%
43%
38%
40%
38%
54
49%

57%
62%
80%
81%
53
47%

Loss
Scenario
(yes)
90%
92%
100%
100%
91%
86%
100%
100%
91%
96%
93%
81%
87%
95%
94%
53
48%

As showcased in Table 14, there were differences in the demographics of Privacy
Officers by scenario. Females reported ‘Yes, they would report’ to a general scenario at a higher
percentage, 41% compared to 20% of males. However, that switches with a gain scenario, where
80% of males reported ‘Yes’ as opposed to 67% of females. For the loss scenario, the
percentages were fairly similar, 90% (males) and 92% (females). Differences are shown among
education levels and reporting, the lowest percentage was for Master’s Degree holding Privacy
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Officers in a general scenario at 27% and a highest percentage at High School education level
Privacy Officers in both a gain and loss scenario as well as Doctoral Degree Privacy Officers in a
loss scenario, all at 100% reporting rates.
There were large differences among credential holders in a general and loss scenario,
35% and 91% respectively. Department level showed large differences among scenarios
however, these percentages were steady among department levels, with the lowest percentages
reporting ‘Yes’ for the general scenario and the highest percentages reporting ‘Yes’ for the loss
scenario. This trend was evident with the knowledge level as well, even among the levels
ranging from lowest with the general scenario and highest with the loss scenario. The mean for
Age was even across all scenarios as well as for percentage of years worked in healthcare.
Bivariate Analysis of Breach Reporting
Chi-square explores the relationship between two categorical variables as it compares the
frequencies of cases in each category against expected values to determine if there is an
association (Pallant, 2013). A comparison of the calculated chi-square statistic with the chisquare distribution determined the probability of the test results. The test is suitable for use as
there are independent observations with mutually exclusive categories (Boslaugh, 2013). The
independent and control variables were individually tested with each of the breach scenarios
(dependent variables) with a significance level of 0.05.
For the first dependent variable, there was a significant result between the General
Breach Scenario and Credential. The counts are provided in Table 15.
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Table 15: Chi-Square - General & Credential Counts
Credential Y/N Recode

General Breach
Scenario

Not Report
Report

Total

Count
Count
Count

No
4 (3.3%)
9 (7.3%)
13 (10.6%)

Yes
71 (57.7%)
39 (31.7%
110 (89.4%)

Total
75 (61%)
48 (39%)
123 (100%)

Note: 2 = 4.25, df = 1. Parentheses indicate column percentages
*p=0.039

A Chi-square test for independence (with Yates Continuity Correction) indicated a
significant association between the General Breach Scenario and Credential Status 𝑥 2 (1, n =
123) = 4.25, p = .039, phi = -.21 (small to medium effect size).
The following variables when tested with the General Breach Scenario were not
significant at the 0.05 level:
1. Gender 𝑥 2 (1, n = 123) = .900, p = .343, phi = 0.116
2. Education 𝑥 2 (2, n = 123) = 1.81, p = .404, cramer’s v = .121
3. RHIA/RHIT 𝑥 2 (1, n = 123) = .560, p = .454, phi = -0.084
4. CHPS 𝑥 2 (1, n = 123) = 3.397 p = .065, phi = -0.190
5. Coding 𝑥 2 (1, n = 123) = 2.040 p = .153, phi = -0.161
6. Department 𝑥 2 (2, n = 123) = .157, p = .924, cramer’s v = .036
7. State 𝑥 2 (1, n = 123) = .218, p = .641, phi = -.059
8. Facility Class 𝑥 2 (2, n = 123) = 1.44, p = .486, cramer’s v = 0.108.
9. Profit Status 𝑥 2 (1, n = 123) = .101, p = .751, phi = -.047
10. Knowledge Level 𝑥 2 (2, n = 123) = .050, p = .975, cramer’s v = 0.020
11. Prior Breach 𝑥 2 (1, n = 123) = 3.514, p = .061, phi = .187
For the second dependent variable, there was a significant result between the Gain Breach
Scenario and Education Level. The counts are provided in Table 16.
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Table 16: Chi-Square - Gain & Education Counts
Education Level

Gain Breach Not Report
Scenario
Report
Total

Count
Count
Count

High
School/Some
College

Bachelor's
Degree

1 (0.8%)
24 (19.5%)
25 (20.3%)

13 (10.6%)
44 (35.8%)
57 (46.3%)

Graduate
Degree

Total

19 (15.4%) 33 (26.8%)
22 (17.9%) 90 (73.2%)
41 (33.3%) 123 (100%)

Note: 2 = 15.06, df = 2. Parentheses indicate column percentages
p= 0.001

A Chi-square test for independence indicated a significant association between Gain Breach
Scenario and education level 𝑥 2 (2, n = 123) = 15.06, p = .001, cramer’s v = 0.350 (medium
effect size)
There was another significant result between the Gain Breach Scenario and the Coding
Credential. The counts are provided in Table 17.
Table 17: Chi-Square - Gain & Coding Counts
Coding Credential
No
Yes
Total
Gain Breach Not Report
Count
27 (22%)
6 (4.9%) 33 (26.8%)
Scenario
Report
Count
27 (70.7%)
3 (2.4%) 90 (73.2%)
Total
Count
114 (92.7%)
9 (7.3%) 123 (100%)
2
Note:  = 5.813, df = 1. Parentheses indicate column percentages
p=0.016

A Chi-square test for independence indicated a significant association between Gain
Breach Scenario and coding credential 𝑥 2 (1, n = 123) = 5.813, p = .016, phi = -0.253 (small
effect size).
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The following variables when tested with the Gain Breach Scenario were not significant at 0.05
level:
1. Gender 𝑥 2 (1, n = 123) = .019, p = .892, phi = -.046
2. Credentials 𝑥 2 (1, n = 123) = .000, p = .994, phi = .031
3. RHIA/RHIT 𝑥 2 (1, n = 123) = .747, p = .388, phi = .097
4. CHPS 𝑥 2 (1, n = 123) = 2.365 p = .124, phi = -0.165
5. Department 𝑥 2 (2, n = 123) = 3.519, p = .172, cramer’s v = .169
6. State 𝑥 2 (1, n = 123) = 1.196, p = .274, phi = -.117
7. Facility Class 𝑥 2 (2, n = 123) = 2.951, p = .229, cramer’s v = 0.155
8. Profit Status 𝑥 2 (1, n = 123) = .000, p = 1.00, phi = .005
9. Knowledge Level 𝑥 2 (2, n = 123) = 5.106, p = .078, cramer’s v = 0.204
10. Prior Breach 𝑥 2 (1, n = 123) = .178, p = .674, phi = -.058
There were no significant associations at the 0.05 level between any of the variables and
the Loss Breach Scenario:
1. Gender 𝑥 2 (1, n = 123) = .000, p = 1.000, phi = .020
2. Education 𝑥 2 (2, n = 123) = 3.151, p = .207, cramer’s v = .160
3. Credentials 𝑥 2 (1, n = 123) = .357, p = .550, phi = -.102
4. CHPS 𝑥 2 (1, n = 123) = .936 p = .333, phi = -0.129
5. Department 𝑥 2 (2, n = 123) = 4.235, p = .120, cramer’s v = .186
6. State 𝑥 2 (1, n = 123) = .163, p = .686, phi = -.067
7. Facility Class 𝑥 2 (2, n = 123) = .010, p = .995, cramer’s v = .009
8. Knowledge Level 𝑥 2 (2, n = 123) = 2.215, p = .330, cramer’s v = 0.134
9. Prior Breach 𝑥 2 (1, n = 123) = .226, p = .634, phi = -.075
10. Profit Status 𝑥 2 (1, n = 123) = .038, p = .845, phi = .051
Research Question and Hypothesis Testing
This study aimed to address the problem surrounding the unclear nature of breach
reporting by applying Prospect Theory to better understand how Privacy Officer’s make the
reporting determinations. The survey provided three scenarios, a General Breach Scenario, a
Gain Breach Scenario, and a Loss Breach Scenario. The outcomes of these scenarios were the
three dependent variables identified for the logistic regression models. These three models
address research question one with hypotheses 1-15 and research question two with hypotheses
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16-18. Among these there were six hypotheses addressed by three separate models (one for each
dependent variable).
The dependent variables were then compared with chi-square analyses to identify any
differences among them, which addresses research question three and hypotheses 19 and 20. The
next section details the results of the testing. The first set of results addresses the three models
which answer research questions one and two followed by the results of the chi-square analysis
that answers research question three.
General Breach Reporting Analysis
The following section will review the tests for assumptions including Tolerance and VIF
tests, independent variable correlation analyses, model goodness of fit tests, and the multivariate
logistic regression model results for the General Breach Reporting to answer the following
research questions and hypotheses:
RQ1: Does the Privacy Officers’ reference point based on knowledge levels affect their choice
to report a breach of patient information?
H1: Higher percentage of years employed in the healthcare field is positively associated with
reporting future indefinable breaches of healthcare information in a general scenario.
H4: Lower level of self-reported knowledge in healthcare privacy is negatively associated with
reporting future indefinable breaches of healthcare information in a general scenario.
H7: Higher levels of education are positively associated with reporting future indefinable
breaches of healthcare information in a general scenario.
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H10: Attainment of a Certified Healthcare Privacy and Security credential is positively
associated with reporting future indefinable breaches of healthcare information in a general
scenario.
H13: Attainment of a Registered Health Information Administrator or Technician credential is
positively associated with reporting future indefinable breaches of healthcare information in a
general scenario.

RQ2: Does the Privacy Officers’ reference points based on past reporting affect their choice to
report a breach of patient information?
H16: Prior reporting of a breach of healthcare information to the Office for Civil Rights is
positively associated with reporting future indefinable breaches of healthcare information in a
general scenario.
Tolerance/VIF Tests
The Tolerance/VIF test is used to test for the limited assumptions of logistic regression.
The Tolerance/VIF test for lack of multicollinearity is shown in Table 18.

80

Table 18: Tolerance/VIF
General Scenario
Tolerance
VIF
Age
0.794
1.259
Gender
0.927
1.079
Education
0.756
1.324
RHIA and RHIT Credential
0.836
1.196
CHPS Credential
0.840
1.190
Coding Credential
0.854
1.171
Department
0.801
1.248
State Privacy Laws
0.839
1.191
Facility Classification
0.861
1.161
Profit Status
0.798
1.254
% of years worked in healthcare
0.854
1.171
Knowledge Level
0.751
1.331
Prior Breach Status
0.672
1.489

If Tolerance levels are below 0.10 or if VIF values above 10, this would indicate a high
correlation between independent variables. As shown in Table 17, all variables had scores
outside of these ranges, so the test shows a lack of multicollinearity to meet the assumption.
Correlation
An additional method to test for lack of multicollinearity is through correlation analysis
of the independent variables in the model. Table 19 shows the correlations between all
independent variables. ‘Breach Outcome’ and ‘Breach Classification’ had a very high
correlation with ‘Prior Breach Status’ so they were not included in the final model. ‘Years
Employed in Healthcare’ and ‘Years Employed in Healthcare Privacy’ were removed from the
models as they both had high correlations with other variables and only the ‘Percentage of
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Years’ was included. All other correlations between two independent variables or among control
variables were small which demonstrated a lack of multicollinearity.
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Table 19: Correlation of Variables
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Predicting Factors of a General Breach Scenario
A multivariate logistic regression model was performed to examine the impact that
experience and reference points have on the likelihood that survey respondents would report a
breach to the Office for Civil Rights in a general scenario (Pallant, 2013). Results show the
omnibus test of the model coefficients, model fit, and the predicting factors mentioned above for
the General Breach Scenario. The General Breach scenario had a bivariate outcome of Yes or
No.
To determine the goodness of fit of the multivariate logistic regression model, goodness
of fit tests were performed. One of these is an omnibus test of coefficients which tests if the
model as a whole is better than using a null model with no coefficients (Boslaugh, 2013).
Hosmer-Lemeshow Goodness of Fit Test provides the chi-square statistic for this purpose. For
this model the test indicated the chi-square = 4.957, df = 8, and p=0.762. The significance level
is above 0.05 indicates support for the model.
Table 20 shows the results of the multivariate logistic regression analysis.
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Table 20: Logistic Regression - General Scenario
95% C.I.for EXP(B)

Gender
Education
Level
Credentials

Department

Facility
Classification
Profit Status

Knowledge
Level

Intercept
Age
Male
Female
High School/Associate Degree
Bachelor's Degree
Graduate Education
RHIA/RHIT Credential (Y)
CHPS Credential (Y)
Coding Credential (Y)
Executive
HIM/IT/Joint/Other
Compliance
State privacy laws (Y)
Acute Care Hospital
Integrated Healthcare Delivery System
Other
Not for Profit
For Profit
% of years worked in healthcare
Excellent
Above Average
Average
Prior Breach (Y)

B
-1.174
-0.01
Reference
1.235
Reference
-0.193
-1.042
-0.017
-1.94
-1.798
Reference
-0.483
0.267
-0.198
Reference
0.182
0.611
Reference
0.259
0.042
Reference
-0.3
-0.081
1.487

Std.
Error
2.122
0.028
0.892
0.598
0.724
0.441
0.819
1.177
0.613
0.759
0.46
0.589
0.569
0.558
0.88
0.486
0.773
0.576

N=123
*Indicates statistical significance at p≤.05
Cox & Snell R Square = 0.173
Nagelkerke R Square = 0.235
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EXP(B)
0.309
0.99
3.437
0.825
0.353
0.983
0.144
0.166
0.617
1.306
0.821
1.199
1.842
1.296
1.043
0.741
0.922
4.422

Lower
0.937
0.599
0.255
0.085
0.414
0.029
0.016
0.186
0.295
0.333
0.378
0.604
0.434
0.186
0.286
0.203
1.431

Upper
1.046
19.733
2.664
1.456
2.332
0.716
1.663
2.05
5.785
2.021
3.802
5.612
3.872
5.855
1.921
4.198
13.663

Hypothesis Test
Wald ChiSquare
df
Sig.
0.306
1
0.58
0.135
1
0.713
1.917
1
0.166
0.104
1
0.747
2.076
1
0.15
0.002
1
0.969
5.605
1
0.018*
2.334
1
0.127
0.621
1
0.431
0.123
1
0.725
0.185
1
0.667
0.095
1
0.758
1.154
1
0.283
0.215
1
0.643
0.002
1
0.962
0.381
1
0.537
0.011
1
0.917
6.669
1
0.010*

Table 20 presents results from the logistic regression model, which predicts the reporting
of a General Breach Scenario. The model contained five independent variables (Education
Level, Credentials, Percentage of years worked in healthcare, Knowledge Level, and Prior
Breach Status). For this model, the CHPS credential and Prior Breach Status were significantly
associated with reporting a breach. The CHPS credential was significant at p=0.018 with an
odds ratio of 0.144 indicating that an individual with a CHPS credential, with limited
information, is 0.144 times less likely than someone without a CHPS credential reporting a
general breach to OCR. Prior Breach Status was statistically significant as well at p=0.010 with
an odds ratio of 4.422 indicating that a respondent who had reported a prior breach is 4.422 times
more likely to report a general breach, with limited information, to OCR than a respondent who
had not reported a prior breach. Due to the high odds ratio of the Prior Breach variable, a
univariate model was attempted to understand the impact that particular variable had on the
model. Once the data were split between two new data sets the numbers were not sufficient to
run the logistic regression models. The Cox & Snell R Square and Nagelkerke R Square
indicate the amount of variation in the dependent variable explained by the model (Pallant,
2013). The variation determined by the model is between 17.3% and 23.5%.
Gain Breach Reporting Analysis
The following section will review the tests for assumptions including Tolerance and VIF
tests, independent variable correlation analyses, model goodness of fit tests, and the multivariate
logistic regression model results for the Gain Breach Reporting to answer the following research
questions and hypotheses:
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RQ1: Does the Privacy Officers’ reference point based on knowledge levels affect their choice
to report a breach of patient information?
H2: Higher percentage of years employed in the healthcare field is positively associated with
reporting future indefinable breaches of healthcare information in a gain scenario.
H5: Lower level of self-reported knowledge in healthcare privacy is negatively associated with
reporting future indefinable breaches of healthcare information in a gain scenario.
H8: Higher levels of education are positively associated with reporting future indefinable
breaches of healthcare information in a gain scenario.
H11: Attainment of a Certified Healthcare Privacy and Security credential is positively
associated with reporting future indefinable breaches of healthcare information in a gain
scenario.
H14: Attainment of a Registered Health Information Administrator or Technician credential is
positively associated with reporting future indefinable breaches of healthcare information in a
gain scenario.

RQ2: Does the Privacy Officers’ reference points based on past reporting affect their choice to
report a breach of patient information?
H17: Prior reporting of a breach of healthcare information to the Office for Civil Rights is
positively associated with reporting future indefinable breaches of healthcare information in a
gain scenario.
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Tolerance/VIF Tests
The Tolerance/VIF test is used to test for the limited assumptions of logistic regression.
The Tolerance/VIF test for lack of multicollinearity is shown in Table 21.
Table 21: Tolerance/VIF
Gain Scenario
Tolerance
VIF
Age
0.794 1.259
Gender
0.927 1.079
Education
0.756 1.324
RHIA and RHIT Credential
0.836 1.196
CHPS Credential
0.840 1.190
Coding Credential
0.854 1.171
Department
0.801 1.248
State Privacy Laws
0.839 1.191
Facility Classification
0.861 1.161
Profit Status
0.798 1.254
% of years worked in healthcare
0.854 1.171
Knowledge Level
0.751 1.331
Prior Breach Status
0.672 1.489

As shown in Table 21, all variables had Tolerance/VIF scores outside of the high
correlation ranges (Tolerance >0.10 or VIF <10), therefore there is a low risk of multicollinearity
in the multivariate logistic regression model predicting the reporting of a breach in a gain
scenario.
Correlation
An additional method to test for a lack of multicollinearity is through correlation analysis
of the independent variables in the model. Table 19 shows the correlations between all
independent variables. ‘Breach Outcome’ and ‘Breach Classification’ had a very high
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correlation with ‘Prior Breach Status’ so they were not included in the final model. ‘Years
Employed in Healthcare’ and ‘Years Employed in Healthcare Privacy’ were removed from the
models as they both had high correlations with other variables and only the ‘Percentage of
Years’ was included . All other correlations between two independent variables or among
control variables were small which demonstrated a lack of multicollinearity.
Predicting Factors of a Gain Breach Scenario
A multivariate logistic regression model examined the impact that experience and
reference points have on the likelihood that survey respondents would report a breach to the
Office for Civil Rights in a gain scenario (Pallant, 2013). Results show the omnibus test of the
model coefficients, model fit, and the predicting factors mentioned above for the General Breach
Scenario. The Gain Breach Scenario had a bivariate outcome of Yes or No.
To determine the goodness of fit of the multivariate logistic regression model, goodness
of fit tests were performed. For this model the test indicated the chi-square = 5.530, df = 8, and
p=0.700. The significance level is above 0.05 indicating support for the model.
Table 22 shows the results of the multivariate analysis.
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Table 22: Logistic Regression - Gain Scenario
95% C.I.for EXP(B)

Gender
Education
Level
Credentials

Department

Facility
Classification
Profit Status

Knowledge
Level

Intercept
Age
Male
Female
High School/Associate's Degree
Bachelor's Degree
Graduate Education
RHIA/RHIT Credential (Y)
CHPS Credential (Y)
Coding Credential (Y)
Executive
HIM/IT/Joint/Other
Compliance
State privacy laws (Y)
Acute Care Hospital
Integrated Healthcare Delivery
System
Not for Profit
For Profit
% of years worked in healthcare
Excellent
Above Average
Average
Prior Breach (Y)

B
7.662
-0.031
Reference
-1.100
Reference
-3.318
-4.317
0.693
-1.347
-3.667
Reference
-0.723
-0.902
-0.331
Reference

Std.
Error
2.784
0.032
0.969
1.490
1.568
0.569
0.697
1.270
0.754
0.883
0.555
-

EXP(B)
2126.323
0.969
0.333
0.036
0.013
1.999
0.260
0.026
0.485
0.406
0.718
-

Lower
0.911
0.050
0.002
0.001
0.655
0.066
0.002
0.111
0.072
0.242
-

1.031
2.223
0.672
0.288
6.100
1.019
0.308
2.127
2.291
2.131
-

0.004
Reference
0.312
-0.613
Reference
0.525
0.981
0.650

0.703
0.715
0.992
0.542
1.110
0.738

1.004
1.367
0.542
1.691
2.667
1.915

0.253
0.336
0.077
0.585
0.303
0.451

3.981
5.552
3.791
4.889
23.477
8.130

N=123
*Indicates statistical significance at p≤.05
Cox & Snell R Square = 0.272
Nagelkerke R Square = .395
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Upper

Hypothesis Test
Wald ChiSquare
df
7.576
1
0.976
1
1.290
1
4.958
1
7.585
1
1.480
1
3.736
1
8.337
1
0.920
1
1.043
1
0.356
1
0.000
0.191
0.381
0.940
0.781
0.776

1
1
1
1
1
1

Sig.
0.006
0.323
0.256
0.026*
0.006*
0.224
0.053
0.004*
0.338
0.307
0.551
0.996
0.662
0.537
0.332
0.377
0.378

The model contained five independent variables (Education Level, Credentials,
Percentage of years worked in healthcare, Knowledge Level, and Prior Breach Status). For this
model, three of the independent variables were statistically significant. The Bachelor’s Degree
was significant at p=0.026 with an odds ratio of 0.036 indicating that someone with a Bachelor’s
Degree reporting a breach, with limited information but framed from a Gain point of view, to
OCR is 0.036 times less likely than someone with a High School or Associate’s Degree.
Graduate Education was statistically significant as well at p=0.006 with an odds ratio of 0.013
indicating that a respondent who with a Graduate Education is 0.013 times less likely to report a
breach, with limited information but framed from a Gain point of view, to OCR. The third
independent variable that was statistically significant was Coding Credential at p=0.004 with an
odds ratio of 0.026 indicating that a respondent with a Coding Credential reporting a breach,
with limited information but framed from a Gain point of view, to OCR is 0.026 times less likely
than a respondent without a Coding Credential. The Cox & Snell R Square and Nagelkerke R
Square indicate the amount of variation in the dependent variable explained by the model
(Pallant, 2013). The variation determined by the model is between 27.2% and 39.5%.
Loss Breach Reporting Analysis
The following section will review the tests for assumptions including Tolerance and VIF
tests, independent variable correlation analyses, model goodness of fit tests, and the multivariate
logistic regression model results for the Loss Breach Reporting to answer the following research
questions and hypotheses:
RQ1: Does the Privacy Officers’ reference point based on knowledge levels affect their choice
to report a breach of patient information?
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H3: Higher percentage of years employed in the healthcare field is positively associated with
reporting future indefinable breaches of healthcare information in a loss scenario.
H6: Lower level of self-reported knowledge in healthcare privacy is negatively associated with
reporting future indefinable breaches of healthcare information in a loss scenario.
H9: Higher levels of education are positively associated with reporting future indefinable
breaches of healthcare information in a loss scenario.
H12: Attainment of a Certified Healthcare Privacy and Security credential is positively
associated with reporting future indefinable breaches of healthcare information in a loss scenario.
H15: Attainment of a Registered Health Information Administrator or Technician credential is
positively associated with reporting future indefinable breaches of healthcare information in a
loss scenario.

RQ2: Does the Privacy Officers’ reference points based on past reporting affect their choice to
report a breach of patient information?
H18: Prior reporting of a breach of healthcare information to the Office for Civil Rights is
positively associated with reporting future indefinable breaches of healthcare information in a
loss scenario.
Tolerance/VIF
The Tolerance/VIF test is used to test for the limited assumptions of logistic regression.
The Tolerance/VIF test for lack of multicollinearity is shown in Table 23.
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Table 23: Tolerance/VIF
Loss Scenario
Tolerance
VIF
Age
0.794 1.259
Gender
0.927 1.079
Education
0.756 1.324
RHIA and RHIT Credential
0.836 1.196
CHPS Credential
0.840 1.190
Coding Credential
0.854 1.171
Department
0.801 1.248
State Privacy Laws
0.839 1.191
Facility Classification
0.861 1.161
Profit Status
0.798 1.254
% of years worked in healthcare
0.854 1.171
Knowledge Level
0.751 1.331
Prior Breach Status
0.672 1.489

As shown in Table 23, all variables had scores outside of the high correlation
ranges (Tolerance >0.10 or VIF <10), so the test shows a lack of multicollinearity to meet the
assumption.
Correlation
Table 19 shows the correlations between all variables which tests for the lack of
multicollinearity. ‘Breach Outcome’ and ‘Breach Classification’ had a very high correlation
with ‘Prior Breach Status’ so they were not included in the final model. ‘Years Employed in
Healthcare’ and ‘Years Employed in Healthcare Privacy’ were removed from the models as they
both had high correlations with other variables and only the ‘Percentage of Years’ was included .
All other correlations between two independent variables or among control variables were small
which demonstrated a lack of multicollinearity.
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While the study met the overall assumptions for logistic regression including a lack of
multicollinearity, the data set was homogenous in the outcome as indicated in Figure 9.

Number of Survey Respondents

RQ3: Does the framing of a scenario affect Privacy Officers’ choice to
report a breach of information?
120
100
80
60
40
20
0

General Breach Scenario

Gain Breach Scenario

Loss Breach Scenario

Dependent Variables
Not Report

Report

Figure 9: Scenario Framing Distribution
Figure 9 shows that of the 123 respondents, 91.9% (113) chose Yes they would report the
breach while 8.1% (10) respondents chose No they would not report. The Loss Breach Scenario
in Figure 9 indicated that there was no need to run a model of predicting factors.
Post Regression Analysis
After running the logistic regression models, predicted probabilities were calculated
using marginal standardization. In this technique, the estimate of breach reporting was
“proportionally adjusted according to a weight for each level of the confounding factors” (Muller
and MacLehose, 2014). These predicted probabilities range from 0% to 100% (Muller and
MacLehose, 2014). Table 24 shows the results of the predicted probabilities.
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Table 24: Predicted Probabilities of Multivariate Logistic Regression
Gender

Male (ref)
Female
Education Level
High School/Associate Degree (ref)
Bachelor's Degree
Graduate Education
RHIA Credential
No (ref)
Yes
CHPS Credential
No (ref)
Yes
Coding Credential
No (ref)
Yes
Department
Executive (ref)
HIM/IT/Joint/Other
Compliance
State Privacy Laws
No (ref)
Yes
Facility Classification Acute Care Hospital (ref)
Integrated Healthcare Delivery
System
Other
Profit Status
Not for Profit (ref)
For Profit
Knowledge Level
Excellent (ref)
Above Average
Average
Prior Breach Status
No (ref)
Yes
Significance denotes differences from reference category
* p<0.1 ; ** p<0.05 ; *** p<0.001

General
0.202
0.396
0.482
0.417
0.272
0.371
0.396
0.427
0.127**
0.401
0.130
0.441
0.340
0.468
0.404
0.339
0.329

Gain
0.875
0.709
0.982
0.716**
0.562**
0.675
0.790
0.760
0.575**
0.767
0.261**
0.813
0.715
0.666
0.750
0.685
0.742

0.370
0.463
0.366
0.421
0.405
0.353
0.413
0.209
0.472**

0.763
0.652
0.713
0.759
0.657
0.765
0.860
0.666
0.751

Under the General Breach Scenario, holding everything else constant, the CHPS
Credential variable and the Prior Breach Status variable were significant at the 0.05 alpha level.
Privacy Officers that hold the CHPS Credential are less likely to report a breach under a general
scenario (predicted probability of 12.7% for those with the CHPS Credential, versus 42.7% for
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those who do not have the credential). Privacy Officers that have previously reported a prior
breach are more likely to report a breach under a general scenario (predicted probability of
47.2% with a prior breach, versus 20.9% with no prior reported breaches).
Under the Gain Breach Scenario, holding everything else constant, Bachelor’s Degree
and Graduate Education as well as the CHPS Credential and the Coding Credential were
significant at the 0.05 level. Privacy Officers that have a Bachelors or Graduate Education are
less likely to report a breach under a gain scenario (predicted probability of 56.2% for those with
a graduate education and 71.6% for those with a bachelor’s degree, versus 98.2% for those with
a high school diploma or an associate’s degree). Privacy Officers that hold the CHPS Credential
are less likely to report a breach under a gain scenario (predicted probability of 57.5% for those
with the CHPS Credential, versus 76% for those who do not have the credential). Privacy
Officers that hold a Coding Credential are less likely to report a breach under a gain scenario
(predicted probability of 26.1% for those with a Coding Credential, versus 76.7% for those who
do not have the credential).
Bivariate Analysis of Framing Effects
The final research question examines the impact framing has on the choice Privacy
Officers make to report a breach to OCR. The three categorical dependent variables are
compared for this analysis to determine statistical differences in the choices the respondents
made. The analysis between the General Breach Scenario variable and the Gain Breach Scenario
variable are shown in Table 25.
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Table 25: Chi-Square - General & Gain Counts

General
Breach
Scenario
Total

Not Report

Count

Gain Scenario
No
Yes
27 (22%)
48 (39%)

Report

Count

6 (4.9%)

42 (34.1)

48 (39%)

Count

33 (26.8%)

90 (73.2%)

123 (100%)

Total
75 (61%)

Note: 2 = 7.08, df = 1. Parentheses indicate column percentages
p=0.008

The chi-square test for independence (with Yates Continuity Correction) as shown in
Table 24 indicated a significant association between the General Breach Scenario and the Gain
Breach Scenario 𝑥 2 (1, n = 123) = 7.080, p = .008, phi = .259 (small effect size). Therefore the
chi-square analysis shows the proportion of respondents reporting in a general scenario is
statistically different from the proportion of respondents reporting in a gain scenario.
The analysis between the Gain Breach Scenario variable and the Loss Breach Scenario
variable is shown in Table 26.
Table 26: Chi-Square - Gain & Loss Counts
Loss Breach Scenario
Not Report
Report
Total
Not Report Count
9 (7.3%)
24 (19.5%)
33 (26.8%)
Gain Breach
Scenario
Report
Count
1 (0.8%)
89 (72.4%)
90 (73.2%)
Total
Count
10 (8.1%)
113 (91.9%)
123 (100%)
2
Note:  = 18.762, df = 1. Parentheses indicate column percentages
p= 0.000
A Chi-square test for independence (with Fisher’s Exact Test) indicated a significant
association between Gain Breach Scenario and Loss Breach Scenario 𝑥 2 (1, n = 123) = 18.762, p
= .000, phi = .424 (medium effect size). Therefore the chi-square analysis shows the proportion
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of respondents reporting in a gain scenario is statistically different from the proportion of
respondents reporting in a loss scenario.
Review of Open-Ended Comments
The final question of the survey was an open-ended question which cited a recent journal
published by AHIMA and asked for feedback from participants. The question was as follows:
“The April 2017 cover story for the Journal of AHIMA was titled “Is HIPAA Outdated?” What
are your thoughts regarding the HIPAA legislation in terms of breach notification and its ability
to adapt? Please add any additional comments regarding breach notification that you feel would
be useful to this study.” Open coding of the responses was performed to identify key themes
(Corbin & Strauss, 2014). These themes and example comments are located in Table 27.
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Table 27: Open-Ended Comments
Themes
Need for
Clarification/Guidance/More
Information

Quotes
“Additional clarity is needed around determining if a breach is reportable.”

Current Law Descriptions –
Negative

“I think it is outdated and the requirements are getting more cumbersome and draconian to
implement and maintain compliance.”

“I feel we need more detailed guidelines as far as exact procedures/practices on how to
protect PHI…”

“The HIPAA policy could definitely use an update. Technology has significantly
advanced since the law was enacted.”
Current Law Descriptions –
Positive

“I believe there were improvements with Omnibus and breach notification which made
assessment more objective and consistent (ie., four factor analysis), and provided a method
for good documentation about how privacy officers reached their conclusions…”
“I do not think HIPAA is outdated, since its provisions remain relevant.”

Consideration of new security
issues

“I feel that phishing and cyberattacks are not fully able to be vetted through the current
four-step process very well…”
“Cumbersome but necessary - cyber attacks are concerning - government mandates for
quality programs take away money that could be spent to help assess / prevent risks related
to breaches - it is a catch 22”

Electronic/Technological
Updates

“HIPAA was created in the VCR era. We have a lot more technology, such as smart
phones, social media that brings an whole new scope of HIPAA into play”
“Unfortunately, current legislation has not caught up to technological advances and risks”
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CHAPTER 5: DISCUSSION
This chapter summarizes the findings from the hypotheses test and their impact on the
research questions, details the theoretical contributions as well as the practical contributions,
discusses the implications of the findings for Public Affairs, points out the limitations of the
study, explores areas of future research, and provides a conclusion for the study.
Summary of Hypotheses
Reporting a breach of patient information is not inherently good or bad. Depending on
the circumstances and the individual’s viewpoint it could be one or both. The key here is the
scenarios are dealing with ambiguous breaches, they could or could not be harmful to the patient.
There is an unknown element.
Research question one explored the effects a respondent’s reference point based on
knowledge levels had on the choice to report a breach of patient information. The results of the
hypotheses testing for research question one are located in Table 28.
Table 28: Hypothesis Testing RQ 1

H1

H2

H3

Alternative Hypothesis
Higher percentage of years employed in the
healthcare field is positively associated with reporting
future indefinable breaches of healthcare information
in a general scenario.
Higher percentage of years employed in the
healthcare field is positively associated with reporting
future indefinable breaches of healthcare information
in a gain scenario.
Higher percentage of years employed in the
healthcare field is positively associated with reporting
future indefinable breaches of healthcare information
in a loss scenario.
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Outcome
Fail to reject null hypothesis

Fail to reject null hypothesis

Fail to reject null hypothesis

H4

H5

H6

H7

H8

H9

H10

H11

H12

H13

H14

Alternative Hypothesis
Lower level of self-reported knowledge in healthcare
privacy is negatively associated with reporting future
indefinable breaches of healthcare information in a
general scenario.
Lower level of self-reported knowledge in healthcare
privacy is negatively associated with reporting future
indefinable breaches of healthcare information in a
gain scenario.
Lower level of self-reported knowledge in healthcare
privacy is negatively associated with reporting future
indefinable breaches of healthcare information in a
loss scenario.
Higher levels of education are positively associated
with reporting future indefinable breaches of
healthcare information in a general scenario.
Higher levels of education are positively associated
with reporting future indefinable breaches of
healthcare information in a gain scenario.
Higher levels of education are positively associated
with reporting future indefinable breaches of
healthcare information in a loss scenario.
Attainment of a Certified Healthcare Privacy and
Security credential is positively associated with
reporting future indefinable breaches of healthcare
information in a general scenario.
Attainment of a Certified Healthcare Privacy and
Security credential is positively associated with
reporting future indefinable breaches of healthcare
information in a gain scenario.
Attainment of a Certified Healthcare Privacy and
Security credential is positively associated with
reporting future indefinable breaches of healthcare
information in a loss scenario.
Attainment of a Registered Health Information
Administrator or Technician credential is positively
associated with reporting future indefinable breaches
of healthcare information in a general scenario.
Attainment of a Registered Health Information
Administrator or Technician credential is positively
associated with reporting future indefinable breaches
of healthcare information in a gain scenario.
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Outcome
Fail to reject null hypothesis

Fail to reject null hypothesis

Fail to reject null hypothesis

Fail to reject null hypothesis

Fail to reject null hypothesis

Fail to reject null hypothesis

Fail to reject null hypothesis

Fail to reject null hypothesis

Fail to reject null hypothesis

Fail to reject null hypothesis

Fail to reject null hypothesis

H15

Alternative Hypothesis
Attainment of a Registered Health Information
Administrator or Technician credential is positively
associated with reporting future indefinable breaches
of healthcare information in a loss scenario.

Outcome
Fail to reject null hypothesis

While there was an expected impact on decision-making from percentage of years
employed, self-reported knowledge level, and RHIA/RHIT credential, there was not a
statistically significant impact in either model and thus fail to reject the null hypothesis for both
the general scenarios and the gain scenario.
There was a statistically significant result for higher levels of education within the gain
model which indicates that those with higher levels of education, bachelor’s and graduate
degrees, are less likely than respondents with only a high school or associate’s degree, to report a
breach with known costs and known benefits of reduced liability and instead choose to take the
chance that no costs or corrective actions occur. This is different from the general model which
saw no statistical difference between the two groups. While the results from the gain model may
seem out of place, they show that those with additional education may feel they have a better
understanding of the prompt and/or the reporting guidelines and are willing to take the chance
that they are making the correct decision.
There was a statistically significant result for Certified Healthcare Privacy and Security
credential within the general model. While the gain model was not significant at the p<0.05
level, it was reasonably close with p=0.053. This concludes that the CHPS credential was the
strongest predictor as it was significant for both models (one at p<0.05 and one at p<0.10). This
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is reiterated with the predicted probabilities which saw CHPS statistically significant at the 0.05
level for both the general and gain breach scenario models.
An individual with a CHPS credential has demonstrated advanced knowledge in the area
of privacy. The model results indicate that a respondent with a CHPS is less likely than a
respondent without a CHPS to report either a general ambiguous breach or a breach with known
costs and known benefits of reduced liability and instead choose to take the chance that no costs
or corrective actions occur. This falls in line again with the education level, where more
knowledge aligns with the willingness to take a chance.
Research question 2 explored the effects the respondent’s reference point based on past
reporting had on their choice to report a breach of patient information. The results of the
hypotheses testing for research question two are located in Table 29.
Table 29: Hypothesis Testing RQ 2

H16

H17

H18

Hypothesis
Prior reporting of a breach of healthcare information
to the Office for Civil Rights is positively associated
with reporting future indefinable breaches of
healthcare information in a general scenario.
Prior reporting of a breach of healthcare information
to the Office for Civil Rights is positively associated
with reporting future indefinable breaches of
healthcare information in a gain scenario.
Prior reporting of a breach of healthcare information
to the Office for Civil Rights is positively associated
with reporting future indefinable breaches of
healthcare information in a loss scenario.

Outcome
Reject null hypothesis

Fail to reject null hypothesis

Fail to reject null hypothesis

The general scenario found Prior Reporting to be statistically significant, but it was not
significant for a gain scenario. This indicates that respondents who had reported a prior breach
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were more likely to report an ambiguous breach in the future if they knew little about the
incident. However, the statistical difference was not present when participants were provided
additional detail and presented with options that included known costs and known benefits of
reduced liability or a chance that there might be no costs or corrective actions occur, or high
costs and corrective actions. The statistical significance in the general scenario is appropriate as
those who have dealt with the process previously may err on the side of caution with little
information. However, they may become more discerning when presented with additional
information.
Research question 3 explored the effects the framing of the scenario had on the
respondent’s choice to report a breach of patient information. The results of the hypotheses
testing for research question one are located in Table 30.
Table 30: Hypothesis Testing RQ 3

H19

H20

Hypothesis
A breach of healthcare information scenario framed as
a gain is positively associated with privacy officers
classifying the breach as reportable to the Office for
Civil Rights.

Outcome
Reject null hypothesis

A breach of healthcare information scenario framed as
a loss is negatively associated with privacy officers
classifying the breach as reportable to the Office for
Civil Rights.

Reject null hypothesis

The chi-square analysis found that the proportion of respondents who would report a
breach under a general scenario was statistically different from the proportion of respondents
who would report a breach under a gain scenario. The proportion of respondents who would

104

report a breach under a gain scenario is statistically different from the proportion of respondents
who would report a breach under a loss scenario as well. When reviewing the descriptive
statistics as the proportion of the respondents visually changes between the three dependent
variables. Figure 9 graphically presents this information.
Theoretical Contributions
Based on the literature review and the theoretical models used in this study, the reference
point and framing affect the choice a Privacy Officer makes when determining whether to report
a breach. This study found that some aspects of a reference point do have an impact on the
choice a Privacy Officer makes, including their level of education, types of credentials held, and
whether they had reported a previous breach. Other aspects that may compose a reference point
were not significant, including the percentage of years worked in healthcare privacy and selfreported knowledge levels. A reference point is a key construct of Prospect Theory under
Kahneman and Tversky (1979). The findings from this study indicate support for the construct,
that individuals do not take a risk solely on the utility they may receive from the outcome;
instead they base the decision relative to a neutral reference point (Kahneman & Tversky, 1979).
The other key construct identified from previous literature is framing, that individuals
view and evaluate risk differently when presented with a gain or a loss concept (Kahneman &
Tversky, 1979). The findings from this study align with the literature, there is a difference in the
way respondents answered based on the framing of the risk. The majority of respondents
answered that they would not report when presented with a general scenario with no
specifications given to the type of risk. When presented with a gain scenario, this percentage
reporting increased and then increased again with a loss scenario.
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This study further contributes to the body of literature of Prospect Theory and expands
upon the healthcare and management usage of the theory. While not using the latest full iteration
of Cumulative Prospect Theory due to constraints, this study did have findings that align with the
primary constructs of the theory which are building blocks for future studies. The theory, while
still not widely used, can provide a backbone, even in construct form, for decision-making
during study formulation.
Practical Contributions
The study findings have practical contributions to the body of knowledge of AHIMA
members, Privacy Officers, and breach determination. From a self-reported knowledge level, it
is of note that all who participated in the study felt they had at least an average knowledge about
privacy, with the majority reporting above average or excellent. At the end of the survey, an area
for freeform comments was available, and some write-ins requested additional detail on the
scenarios stating that they would need more information to make a decision. This is indicative
that the knowledge level of those participating is high, that they understand these decisions
generally require further investigation and a certain level of detail. AHIMA can build upon this
result by increasing their literature base with articles providing guidance on areas of need and
scenario based guidance.
The constructs identified by the theoretical literature impact the practical contributions of
the study. It is vital that Privacy Officers understand their reference points and how their
framing of an incident can affect their response. Education levels were statistically significant
and may indicate a need for higher participation in degree programs by Privacy Officers. This is
an area that could be expanded upon to ensure those individuals in a facility making decisions
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are fully informed. While there may not be regulations in the federal policies about the
qualifications of designated Privacy Officers, AHIMA utilizes educational requirements for their
credentials. These requirements should be held firm and potentially increased as further research
dictates. AHIMA could also be instrumental in marketing educational requirements to facilities,
encouraging employers to hire individuals with higher level degrees. This is already being
performed to some extent with the sample job descriptions available in their Body of
Knowledge.
There is an indication of a need for Privacy Officer qualifications by the credential
results. With the statistical significance of the CHPS credential in both models it lends credence
to the value of the advanced knowledge required to obtain the credential and the impact it has on
the decision-making process. An interesting finding was that the coding credential was
statistically significant. A review of the coding credential domains and subdomains may show
specific content that is valuable for Privacy Officers as well. These findings are key for AHIMA
and their members. The results are a testament to obtain a credential and they are helpful in
marketing credential holders in the marketplace. A focus on compliance aspects of the
credentials may be beneficial as well as better ethical standards.
An interesting finding of the study was the demographics of the responses to the three
breach scenario questions. When reviewing them at face value outside of the general/gain/loss
framing, there was a change in response to the type of scenario. The first scenario was just a
basic statement, where the majority responded they would not report. When provided a detailed
scenario based on paper records, the majority chose to report. Finally, when provided a detailed
scenario based on ransomware the overwhelming majority chose to report. The shift from the
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second to the third scenario may indicate a comfort in handling paper privacy concerns and a
wariness with technological privacy concerns, especially ransomware. Respondents may have
chosen to err on the side of caution due to the ambiguity of ransomware attacks, where the level
of compromise to the information may not be as evident.
Privacy officers should review the results of this study carefully and utilize them to
enhance their ability to manage breach determinations in their workplace. Higher levels of
education, credentials, and knowledge base may enable Privacy Officers to market themselves
better in the workplace and enhance their positions within healthcare organizations. Privacy
Officers should take advantage of opportunities to increase their exposure to all three of these
areas, education, credentials and knowledge base.
The results of this study indicate that breach determination is a case by case basis and
dependent on individual decisions. However, healthcare organizations can utilize these results to
develop plans with their internal and external stakeholders in the event of a breach of patient
information. Implications of a breach are shaped by the type, category, method of access, and
number of patients affected, however, it is important to have these high-level plans in place so
everyone involved has a basic understanding. Development of these plans should include
discussions of when reporting is appropriate and why it is important to report regardless of the
consequences.
This recommendation is in line with industry trends. The Emergency Prepardeness and
Security Trends in Healthcare survey identified that the third highest safety concern of healthcare
organizations is from cyberattacks (RAVE Mobile Safety, 2018). An example of the type of
plans needed include the case of Anthem, a healthcare insurance company, who experienced one
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of the largest breaches of 2015 and affected 80 million individuals (Keeve, 2016). From that
incident the author created a set of lessons companies should consider for a crisis communication
plan in the case of a breach of patient information. These lessons include early and easy to
understand transparency with the public and authorities which includes a sincere apology and to
offer compensation to victims to help re-establish loyalty (Keeve, 2016). As indicated by this
study, Privacy Officers need the knowledge and education to assist in the development of these
plans.
Policy Contributions
The Office for Civil Rights has previously provided guidance on areas of breach
determination; however, the process still has gaps where Privacy Officers are making their own
decisions. OCR can use the findings of this study to help identify and address these gaps.
Further guidance should be issued to help with the areas of ambiguity and perhaps scenario
based guidance as appropriate.
Many comments from the free-form section touched on the need for guidance or new
legislation to help clarify areas where the policy has left decisions open-ended. One respondent
stated “HIPAA was created in the VCR era. We have a lot more technology, such as
smartphones, social media that brings a whole new scope of HIPAA into play”. With the
advancements made in technology, federal guidance may have a hard time keeping up due to
time constraints in policy creation and revision. Requests for guidance from the open-ended
question include definitions for “breach types” and “compromise”; clarify third party right of
access and “potential” access.

109

The current legislation does not have requirements for Privacy Officers outside of the fact
that covered entities are required to have a “privacy official.” As noted by the findings,
education and credentials are significant to decision making and should be considered as
standards for Privacy Officers. This is an area that could be expanded upon to ensure those
individuals in a facility making decisions are fully informed. Language could be added to the
legislation to outline the requirements and/or suggestions for privacy officials in healthcare
organizations.
Public Affairs Implications
If a patient’s information is stolen from a hacking/IT incident and sold on the
blackmarket, a potentially harmful effect is that of insurance fraud and medical identity theft
(Korolov, 2015; Federal Trade Commission, 2010). An unauthorized user could expend the
patient’s available services or the unauthorized user could receive treatment, which ends up on
the patient’s record as the patient’s history (Korolov, 2015; Amori, 2008).
Patient health information is at risk everyday in the United States. The Annual Report to
Congress by the Department of Health and Human Services found that in 2016 (the most recent
published data), healthcare breaches were reported for almost 27 million patients. While all
types of breaches are occurring, the one that affects the most patients per instance is that of
hacking/IT incidents. This is concerning as these breaches are occurring more frequently. Per a
report from the Office for Civil Rights, the daily ransomware attacks have had a 300% increase
from 2015 to 2016 with about 4000 daily attacks (U.S. Department of Health and Human
Services, 2016). As stated previously, these types of breaches are difficult to define and only
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currently have unofficial guidance from the oversight body, the Office of Civil Rights; meaning
facilities are making more and more determinations internally whether to report.
A driving force behind this study was to understand how Privacy Officers make decisions
because if they make a wrong decision, it can be extremely detrimental to the patients. The
findings from the study indicate that higher knowledge levels of respondents equate to a lower
likelihood of reporting, which can be positive for a facility. However, if the case was reportable,
it may be harmful to patients. It is essential that the federal government take into account the
regulatory burden placed on businesses; however, protecting the privacy of patients must still be
a priority.
Several respondents of the study found the language of the federal policy to be confusing
or overwhelming. One respondent found it “Difficult to keep up with, especially with
sophisticated cyber-attacks and hospitals with little extra money and Human Resources to
monitor and protect.” It is no surprise that the policy may overwhelmed patients as well.
Another respondent stated, “I do believe that for most patients, understanding the HIPAA
standards is a difficult task.” While the Office for Civil Rights has a ‘HIPAA for Individuals’
section, if a patient was not familiar with the oversight body or website they may find it difficult
to locate or navigate. The patchwork system of federal and state policies, along with the gray
areas in the policies, may lead to confusion among patients. This can impact their ability to
advocate for themselves and their private information.
Limitations
There are limitations to this study. The first is that there were self-reported measures
which may have led to bias in the results. One key variable to monitor was that of Knowledge
111

Level, where all respondents chose Average or higher, no respondents chose Below Average or
Poor. There were also errors in reporting that were corrected by the researcher when cleaning
the data. For example, respondents provided ranges for the number of breaches reported and the
lowest number of the range was utilized. This also occurred with respondents answering with a
‘+’ sign, for example 300+ breaches. The ‘+’ was removed by the researcher, but the respondent
did not provide an accurate number.
One of the key limitations of this study is that the population was restricted to AHIMA
members available on the Engage community. This impacts the generalizability of the results.
Many Privacy Officers, especially those working in smaller facilities, may not be AHIMA
members or hold AHIMA credentials. Future research can hopefully become more inclusive to
capture a broader audience to make the results truly generalizable.
While limitations occurred and were accounted for in the study design. The methodology
section discusses these in detail as well, but include the inability for a true experimental research
design due to ethical concerns (mitigated by design controls) and creation of a survey instrument
(mitigated by the use of a pilot study and a subject matter expert).
As evidenced by the descriptive statistics, there was no need to run the third model based
on the loss scenario as there was not enough variation in the dependent variable. Research
question three still used the data for a bivariate analysis of the framing effects and provided a
wealth of information for the theoretical and practical implications, but it was not included in the
statistical models.
The subject of the study may have led to non-participation from those contacted. While
privacy and ethical concerns were addressed and reviewed by the Institutional Review Board,
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potential respondents may not have been allowed, or felt it inappropriate, to participate due to the
sensitive nature of the questionnaire or their facility’s legal requirements.
Future Research
There are vast areas for future research around these topics. A University of Central
Florida team from the Department of Health Management and Informatics (that this researcher
participated with) recently published a paper regarding hospital and breach characteristics which
received positive attention. The findings of this study may influence that research which is still
in progress. A potential future study would be a qualitative review of the free-form comments.
This could bring critical areas needing attention forward for federal policy consideration. The
qualitative study would be beneficial to the private sector for groups like AHIMA and HIMSS to
focus educational initiatives around.
A logical extension of this study would be to distribute the same survey to hospital
executives with the American College of Healthcare Executives and/or the Health Information
Management Systems Society. This would create an interesting comparison between the
employees responsible for reporting and those who would be creating facility policy regarding
breach reporting determination. Third-party firms who assist facilities in making breach
determinations, such as law offices and consultants may also participate with a similar or
modified survey.
Another area of interest for future research would be to explore the patient understanding
of breach determination. Many patients may be unaware that this type of determination occurs in
facilities or impacts their privacy. Due to the numerous privacy and financial breaches in other
sectors, Facebook and Equifax for example, patients may be experiencing fatigue and become
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desensitized to notifications. This would help inform policy about the types and level of
notifications that need to occur, especially with healthcare information breaches as they can be
extremely detrimental as opposed to regular sector breaches.
At the end of 2016, President Barack Obama signed a new policy, the 21st Century Cures
Act, into effect (Majumder, Guerrini, Bollinger, Cook-Deegan, and McGuide, 2017). This
policy has lofty goals and focuses on rapidly developing treatments for many illnesses through
changes to research requirements and information sharing (Majumder et al., 2017). The policy
has many benefits including reducing “bureaucratic red tape” in certain areas; however, it may
not be as positive for patient privacy as the original authors intended (Hudson, Collings, 2017).
As this policy is fairly new, it has not been determined if there is a balance between an
individual’s privacy and the “insatiable demand for data that’s needed to fuel new research”
(Buffone, P., 2016). An example of this comes from the Act which provides the director of the
National Institute of Health (NIH) to require data sharing from research conducted with funds
awarded from NIH (Majumder et al., 2017). This does not seem alarming in a sense due to the
general de-identified nature of the data, but researchers found on multiple occasions that deidentified data can be used to identify individuals, especially in the case of genetic information
with Direct to Consumer testing providers like 23andME and Ancestry.com (Brase, 2018; Erlich,
Shor, Carmi, & Pe’er, 2018). With the onset of this new policy, privacy and the individual
patient’s understanding of the utilization of their information is an area ripe for research.
Conclusion
The purpose of this study was to explore the impact of personal and organizational
knowledge and scenario framing had on the decisions Privacy Officers made in regards to
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privacy breach determination. The study used Prospect Theory as a theoretical framework for
variable selection and study design. The survey was created with the assistance of a subject
matter expert and it was tested using a pilot study. The study targeted individuals with a privacy
designation through the AHIMA Engage community. A total of 479 individuals were contacted
over several weeks with 170 respondents of which were 123 full surveys. After data collection
and cleaning, statistical software was used to run multiple analyses with significant results. The
findings of the study supported the theoretical framework and provided industry and public
affairs implications.
Healthcare privacy is paramount due to the sensitive nature and amount of information
collected by care providers. Even though there are federal and state policies in place to protect
individual patient privacy, the findings of this study show that there is a gap where Privacy
Officers have to make their own decisions, and there is a difference in the types of decisions they
are making on a day to day basis.
With the significant results of the paper identified as education level, credential level, and
scenario-based, they are indicative of a need for educational opportunities and potential
requirements for designated Privacy Officers. This includes initial levels of education as well as
continuing education requirements to ensure the individuals stay up to date on the current trends
and threats in healthcare. Educational initiatives may also be beneficial at the executive level as
these individuals may underestimate the importance of privacy initiatives which could lead to
underreporting of breaches. These educational initiatives may include scenario based training to
identify areas of concern and confusion for their organization. This can assist in developing
well-round policies and procedures for breach reporting. Future research at the executive level
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of understanding and decision-making is crucial for policy implications. Both levels, Privacy
Officer and executive positions, would benefit from scenario-based educational opportunities as
well.
Healthcare has a variety of settings, from small individual physician practices to large
national integrated delivery systems. The types of care vary from basic preventative care to high
impact invasive treatment. These varieties of settings and care provision lead to difficulties in
identifying a single answer to protecting patient information. The types of systems and
information processes used among these is more a best of fit than a best of breed for this reason.
Future guidance and policies need to address these gaps and can use the insight provided by this
study of areas that influence the decision-making process.
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APPENDIX A: INITIAL SURVEY EMAIL
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Subject: Survey Participation Request
Message:
Good Morning/Afternoon/Evening,
My name is Amanda Walden and I am a doctoral student at the University of Central Florida. I
am currently conducting research for my dissertation to evaluate the decision-making process of
Privacy Officers in regards to breach notification. As you are listed on the AHIMA Engage
community with a Privacy title, I am inviting you to participate in this research study by
completing the survey. Please copy and paste address to use in your desired browser:
http://bit.ly/Privacy_Officer_Survey
The following questionnaire will require approximately 10 minutes to complete. The survey is
anonymous and the results will be publicly reported in aggregate format only. Participation is
strictly voluntary and you may refuse to participate at any time.
Thank you for taking the time to assist in my educational endeavors.
If you require additional information or have questions, please contact me at the number listed
below.
Thank you for your time and consideration.
Sincerely,
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Amanda M. Walden, PhD Candidate
MSHSA, RHIA, CHDA
(407) 823-3613
Amanda.walden@ucf.edu

College of Health and Public Affairs
University of Central Florida
4364 Scorpius Street
Orlando, FL 32816-2205

Reviewed by UCF IRB 10/27/17
UCF IRB
407-823-2901
407-882-2012
irb@ucf.edu

Dissertation Chair: Kendall Cortelyou-Ward
kendall.cortelyou-ward@ucf.edu
(407) 823-2359
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Subject: Privacy Officer Survey
Message:
Good Morning/Afternoon,
Two weeks ago I sent an e-mail asking you to complete a survey about the decision-making
process of Privacy Officers in regards to breach notification. I received 68 participants and the
quality of the data and responses was outstanding. If you completed the survey, thank you very
much!
Unfortunately to have an effective model I need at minimum 115 responses. If you have not
already completed the survey, I ask that you please consider participating. It should only take
about 10 minutes to complete. Simply click the link below to begin answering the questions.
http://bit.ly/Privacy_Officer_Survey
A reminder that the survey is anonymous and the results will be publicly reported in aggregate
format only. Participation is strictly voluntary and you may refuse to participate at any time.
If you require additional information or have questions, please contact me at the number listed
below.
Thank you for your time and consideration.

Sincerely,
Amanda M. Walden, PhD Candidate
MSHSA, RHIA, CHDA
(407) 823-3613
Amanda.walden@ucf.edu

College of Health and Public Affairs
University of Central Florida
4364 Scorpius Street
Orlando, FL 32816-2205

Reviewed by UCF IRB 10/27/17
UCF IRB
407-823-2901
407-882-2012
irb@ucf.edu

Dissertation Chair: Kendall Cortelyou-Ward
kendall.cortelyou-ward@ucf.edu
(407) 823-2359
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Subject: Privacy Officer Survey
Message:
Good Morning/Afternoon,
I am writing to follow-up on the request I sent asking you to participate in a survey regarding the
decision-making process of Privacy Officers in regards to breach notification. If you completed
the survey, thank you very much! This survey is drawing to a close, and I am still a few
participants short.
If you have not already completed the survey, I ask that you please consider participating. It
should only take about 10 minutes to complete. Simply click the link below to begin answering
the questions.
http://bit.ly/Privacy_Officer_Survey
A reminder that the survey is anonymous and the results will be publicly reported in aggregate
format only. Participation is strictly voluntary and you may refuse to participate at any time.
If you require additional information or have questions, please contact me at the number listed
below.
Thank you for your time and consideration through this process.

Sincerely,
Amanda M. Walden, PhD Candidate
MSHSA, RHIA, CHDA
(407) 823-3613
Amanda.walden@ucf.edu

College of Health and Public Affairs
University of Central Florida
4364 Scorpius Street
Orlando, FL 32816-2205

Reviewed by UCF IRB 10/27/17
UCF IRB
407-823-2901
407-882-2012
irb@ucf.edu

Dissertation Chair: Kendall Cortelyou-Ward
kendall.cortelyou-ward@ucf.edu
(407) 823-2359
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Risk in Privacy Breach Determination among Privacy Officers
Date
Dear Participant:
My name is Amanda Walden and I am a doctoral student at the University of Central Florida. I
am currently conducting research for my dissertation. The purpose of this research is to evaluate
the decision-making process of Privacy Officers in regards to breach notification. As you are
listed on the AHIMA Engage community with a Privacy title, I am inviting you to participate in
this research study by completing the linked survey.
The following questionnaire will require approximately 10 minutes to complete. There is no
compensation for responding and the study has been reviewed by University of Central Florida
Institutional Review Board for known risk. The survey is anonymous and the results will be
publicly reported in aggregate format only. In order to ensure that all information will remain
confidential, please do not include your name or your organization’s name. Participation is
strictly voluntary and you may refuse to participate at any time. If you choose to participate,
please answer all questions as honestly as possible.
Thank you for taking the time to assist in my educational endeavors. The survey results will
primarily be used for recommendations for current and future federal legislation regarding
healthcare privacy breach reporting.
Completion of the questionnaire will indicate your willingness to participate in this study. If you
require additional information or have questions, please contact me at the number listed below.
This study is being conducted under the direction of Dr. Kendall Courtelyou-Ward at the
University of Central Florida. Please feel free to contact her if you have any questions or
concerns (anonymously if you so choose) regarding the manner in which this study is being
conducted. She can be reached at (407) 823-2359 or by e-mail at kendall.cortelyouward@ucf.edu
Sincerely,
Amanda M. Walden, PhD Candidate
MSHSA, RHIA, CHDA
(407) 823-3613
Amanda.walden@ucf.edu

College of Health and Public Affairs
University of Central Florida
4364 Scorpius Street
Orlando, FL 32816-2205

Reviewed by UCF IRB 10/27/17
UCF IRB Phone: 407-823-2901 & 407-882-2012 Email: irb@ucf.edu
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As you answer this survey, please respond keeping your current facility in mind.
Screening Question:
1. Are you currently employed?
a. Yes
b. No – Conclude Survey
2. Are you the current designated Privacy Officer for your facility?
a. Yes
b. No - Conclude Survey
3. Date of Survey Completion:___________________________
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
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4.What is your Age (in years)? Continuous.
5.What is your Gender?:
a. Male
b. Female
c. Other
d. Prefer not to disclose
6.Select your highest completed level of education:
a. High School
b. Associate’s Degree
c. Bachelor’s Degree
d. Master’s Degree
e. Doctoral Degree
7.Select all AHIMA credentials that you are currently certified to hold:
a. RHIA- Registered Health Information Administrator
b. RHIT- Registered Health Information Technician
c. CCA- Certified Coding Associate
d. CCS- Certified Coding Specialist
e. CCS-P- Certified Coding Specialist- Physician-based
f. CDIP- Certified Documentation Improvement Practitioner
g. CHDA- Certified Health Data Analyst
h. CHPS- Certified in Healthcare Privacy and Security
i. CHTS- Certified Healthcare Technology Specialist
j. CPHI- Certified Professional in Health Informatics
8.Your Privacy role in your current facility falls into which of the following departments,
choose only one.
a. Executive Team
b. HIM Department
c. IT Department
d. Joint HIM/IT Appointment
e. Other - Text Box for fill-in
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9.Is your facility located in a state with additional healthcare specific privacy breach
notification laws? )
States with additional healthcare specific privacy breach notification laws are as follows:
Arkansas
California
Delaware
Florida
Illinois
Kentucky
Maryland
Missouri
Montana
Nevada
New Hampshire
North Dakota
Oregon
Rhode Island
Texas
Wyoming
a. Yes
b. No
10. How would you classify your healthcare facility?
a. Acute Care Hospital
b. Ambulatory Surgery Center
c. Behavioral/Mental Health
d. Clinic/Physician Practice
e. Consulting Service
f. Education
g. Health Information Exchange
h. Home Health/Hospice
i. Integrated Healthcare Delivery System
j. Long Term Care
k. Non-Provider Setting (e.g., govt., vendor, assoc.)
l. Other Provider Setting (e.g., rehab)
m. Regional Extension Center
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11. What is the profit status of your healthcare facility?
a. Non-Profit
b. For-Profit
12. How many years have you been employed in the healthcare field? – Continuous
13. How many years have you been employed in the healthcare privacy field? – Continuous
14. How would you rate your knowledge of healthcare privacy?
a. Excellent
b. Above Average
c. Average
d. Below Average
e. Poor
15. During your time at your current employer, has your facility reported a breach of
Protected Health Information (PHI) to the Office for Civil Rights?
a. Yes
b. No- Skip to Question 19
16. During your time at your current employer, how many breaches of patient Protected
Health Information (PHI) has your facility reported to the Office for Civil Rights? –
Continuous
17. What classification were the breaches indicated in the previous question?
a. Fewer than 500 patients per incident ONLY
b. More than 500 patients per incident ONLY
c. Cases of both ‘Fewer than 500 patients per incident’ and ‘More than 500 patients
per incident’
18. What were the outcomes of the breaches from the Office for Civil Rights? Choose all that
apply.
a. Corrective Action Plan
b. Criminal Penalties
c. OCR Fine
d. None
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19. If a breach of patient PHI occurs in the future that is not clearly identified as reportable,
will you report or not report?
a. Report
b. Not Report

20. Your healthcare facility was unlawfully entered. The individual who broke in potentially
had access to 450 paper patient records that were held in that office. There were no
security cameras to record events, although office supplies were gone through, only a
printer with no PHI was taken. Your policies and procedures are up to date, however they
do not specifically address breach determination for break-in for your facility. All
policies, procedures, training and risk assessment and management are in compliance.
Your next step is to review the four factor risk assessment to determine if the potential
breach is reportable to the patients and the Office for Civil Rights. Upon review:

1) The nature and extent of the PHI involved, including the types of identifiers and

the likelihood of re-identification. – The records are paper based and included
multiple types of unsecured PHI including sensitive patient identifiers.
2) The unauthorized person who used the PHI or to whom the disclosure was made.
– The unknown individual who broke into the facility was not authorized to view
the records and their intent is unknown.
3) Whether the PHI was actually acquired or viewed. – Employees cannot
distinguish if the records have been disturbed, accessed or read.
4) The extent to which the risk to the PHI has been mitigated. – No records were
missing.
Choose one of two options, ‘report’ or ‘do not report’.
If you report, you will bear the cost of reporting but your facility benefits by having your
liability reduced.
If you do not report one of 2 options occur. (A) OCR investigates for any other reason, may
find your facility made an inappropriate determination, fines and/or corrective actions of
unknown levels may be made. OR (B) OCR does not investigate this incident and your
facility benefits by incurring no costs or corrective actions.
a. Report
b. Not Report
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21. An employee at your facility clicked on a link from a Phishing e-mail which led to a
ransomware attack on your facility. Payout was required and access was restored to your
system. The attacker potentially had access to 750 unsecured (unencrypted) patient
records in the system. All policies, procedures, training and risk assessment and
management are in compliance.
Your next step is to review the four factor risk assessment to determine if the potential
breach is reportable to the patients and the Office for Civil Rights. Upon review:
1) The nature and extent of the PHI involved, including the types of identifiers and the

likelihood of re-identification. – The records are electronic based and included multiple
types of unsecured PHI, including patient identifiers.
2) The unauthorized person who used the PHI or to whom the disclosure was made. – The

attacker was not authorized to view the records. No idea of whether other malware was
left behind.
3) Whether the PHI was actually acquired or viewed. – The system cannot distinguish if

records were viewed or copied.
4) The extent to which the risk to the PHI has been mitigated. – malware infection was

removed and PCs reformatted and reloaded.
Choose one of two options, ‘report’ or ‘do not report’.
If you report, there are negative public relations consequences from media reporting and
the incident posted on the OCR website but there is no real possibility of a fine.
If you do not report one of 2 options occur. (A) OCR does not investigate this incident and
your facility incurs no costs/corrective actions/negative public relations. OR (B) A
compliant or other reason allows OCR to open an investigation where they review the
breach determination and decide it was improper, with potentially large fines being issued
with resulting negative media exposure and increased public relations issues.
a. Report
b.Not Report
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22. The April 2017 cover story for the Journal of AHIMA was titled “Is HIPAA Outdated?”
What are your thoughts regarding the HIPAA legislation in terms of breach notification
and its ability to adapt? Please add any additional comments regarding breach notification
that you feel would be useful to this study.
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State
Alabama
Alaska
Arizona
Arkansas
California
Colorado
Connecticut
Delaware
DC
Florida
Georgia
Hawaii
Idaho
Illinois
Indiana
Iowa
Kansas
Kentucky
Louisiana
Maine
Maryland
Massachusetts
Michigan
Minnesota
Mississippi
Missouri

Total
'Privacy' Members
9
79
3
16
8
90
6
70
32
383
7
102
8
40
0
13
1
8
31
300
13
144
1
15
3
29
21
250
15
135
6
63
5
111
9
102
10
117
4
25
10
104
25
113
17
135
8
113
6
66
15
122

State
Montana
Nebraska
Nevada
New Hampshire
New Jersey
New Mexico
New York
North Carolina
North Dakota
Ohio
Oklahoma
Oregon
Pennsylvania
Rhode Island
South Carolina
South Dakota
Tennessee
Texas
Utah
Vermont
Virginia
Washington
West Virginia
Wisconsin
Wyoming
Total
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Total
'Privacy' Members
2
23
4
56
4
53
4
27
10
114
2
31
15
293
12
160
2
29
21
186
9
86
5
40
15
261
1
17
5
69
1
37
17
219
29
420
4
32
2
17
7
104
16
96
7
45
11
118
1
15
479
5293

APPENDIX I: QUESTIONNAIRES DELETED DUE TO MISSING DATA
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Question Number
0
1
2
3
9
11
13

Deleted responses
6
5
5
6
1
3
1

Reasoning
Surveys did not answer all or majority of questions
Respondents answered ‘No’
Respondents answered ‘No’
Respondents did not answer
Respondents did not answer
Respondents did not answer
Respondents did not answer
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Feedback: Comments/Concerns on Questions - For Pilot Study
Should reach outside the limits of AHIMA, there are many non-traditional Health Care
settings that follow the Privacy rules. Provide more options other then report/do not
report more information and other tools are available to determine if it should be reported
.
I would like to see a comments box on the 'If a breach of patient PHI occurs in the future
and is not clearly identified as reportable"... In my current environment, we seek outside
Legal Privacy Counsel to walk through the Breach Assessment and ensure an impartial
party is helping with the determination. This is the trend that I see in Privacy and
Security, where requests for outside expertise from a reputable organization is working
with your company to ensure an unbiased resolution to assessments.
Great study that confirmed some of my thoughts - First, I would have let my moral
compass, ethics and instincts drive my decisions concerning breach notifications (i.e., I
would want to do the right thing for a particular incident, and I would want to work in
organizations with that same culture); and HIPAA, and the liabilities it would present
would be my second thought. However, I do appreciate that nationally, HIPAA increased
public awareness and discussions of the importance of patient privacy and confidentiality
concerns in the age of the EHR.
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I don't think the breach notification and reporting rules are having any impact on breaches.
They were originally designed to shame organizations who weren't careful with PHI but we
are seeing that even the most secure organizations (including the organizations test with
enforcing The rules) are unable to keep PHI safe. Energy should be going into best
practices for that ( not to mention the considerable investment involved) and less to a
strategy that isn't working
Additional clarity is needed around determining if a breach is reportable.
As an HIE/Community Wide Clinical Data Repository, suspected breaches are typically
reported to the institution who originated/contributed data to the HIE. We facilitate
investigation and provide all documentation necessary for the covered entity to make these
determinations and report if they determine that a reportable breach has occurred.
Breach notification assessment is too subjective.
Clearer guidance needs to be published as the risk assessment and process is still subjective.
Consumers are also becoming immune to reports as they may receive many letters that there
"may be" a breach but it could not be validated. Organizations may send a letter to the
patient as a "heads up" even though the organization has determined it does not fully meet
the breach notification requirements.
Cumbersome but necessary - cyber attacks are concerning - government mandates for
quality programs take away money that could be spent to help assess / prevent risks related
to breaches - it is a catch 22.
Cumbersome with minimal guidance when needing to determine breach notification.
Definite need to update. Need to remove the accounting with the exception of inappropriate.
Need to clarify the 3rd party right to access. Need to remove patient right to access for
TPO. Many of the rules are more so up for interpretation vs. clear
definition of compromise is still needed
Difficult to keep up with, especially with sophisticated cyber attacks and hospitals with little
extra money and Human Resources to monitor and protect.

Guidance on "potential" access is needed. A compromised system does not mean data was
accessed. A technical risk assessment would need to be conducted with forensic analysis.
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Additionally, a physical risk assessment would need to be done as in the example of the PHI
left out and someone stole office supplies. There has to be reasonable evidence that the
information was disclosed for a breach to be investigated.With the latest malware that do not
have a storage-footprint, then we probably all can assume one is floating around collecting /
inspecting information. Should we all declare a breach? Security is based on reasonable
assurance. So should breaches. That's where HHS needs to catch up. Also, provide better
guidance documents -- although now the DOJ apparently can't use guidance documents. Too
much confusion all around on this.
HIPAA is alive and well; separate State regulation can be difficult when communicating
with agencies who do not understand HIPAA. Further defined breach types and the
notification process would be welcomed.
HIPAA is and always has been too vague to adhere to with any degree of certainty
HIPAA is outdated, especially in regard to the punitive nature of breach reporting.
HIPAA legislation needs to be updated and additional clarification should be added
regarding the 4-factor assessment and reporting requirements. OCR is behind on review of
cases and needs to find a way to provide more timely feedback to incidents reported that
affect 500+ individuals.
HIPAA needs to be updated to reflect the electronic world in which we live. And, there has
always been tension between protection of patient information and sharing it as promoted by
other data use initiatives by the government. There needs to be more clarification regarding
how Office of Civil Rights would view some of these electronic scenarios so that hospitals,
clnics etc. will be informed and can act accordingly.
HIPAA needs updating.
HIPAA under appreciates the pediatric patient; there are a number of instances where
pediatric issues are not addressed directly. Nancy Davis's comments on HIPAA and
clarifications on patient portals is spot on; especially in a pediatric populations.
HIPAA was created in the VCR era. We have a lot more technology, such as smart phones,
social media that brings an whole new scope of HIPAA into play.
I agree that with the continuous advancing technology we are struggling with inappropriate
use of cell phones, photos, text messages, instant messaging etc. It will require more
direction from the OCR to get better compliance from clinicians and providers wanting to
utilize these methods of communication for patient care.
I am frustrated that I must spend countless hours logging and notifying patients for things
such as misdirected faxes, employee snooping and other bad behaviours that result in few
persons PHI being exposed. I think that this should be a hospital HR policy and leave the
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feds out of it. I agree that breaches involving a large amount of patients needs to be
investigated, mitigated and reported. The fines are unnecessary. I agree with corrective
action plans. The regulations are very difficult to follow and as usual government
regulations leave too much ambiguity that results in much time and money being spent
determining how to handle countless ill defined situations. Health care organizations are
struggling. To spend hours investigating why someone misdirected a fax is insane. In
addition, we reported annually our breaches, less than 500, abiding by the law and now we
are the focus of a full blown investigation that has been gong on for 2 years. This after we
spent $150,000 on software to "meet HIPAA security standards". Seems that following the
rules gets you punished. I suspect that if OCR looked at every covered entity they would
find infractions worthy of their fines. Bottom line, they should offer more educational and
clarity on HIPAA and less punishment. The regulations lend themselves to sure failure this
may be by design.
I appreciate that patient information needs to be kept private. I do think the HIPAA laws
could stand to be revised, however. It's not 'out-dated' per-say, but could use fine-tuning.
I believe it is necessary, but needs to be tweaked with the rising security breaches.
I believe there were improvements with Omnibus and breach notification which made
assessment more objective and consistent (ie., four factor analysis), and provided a method
for good documentation about how privacy officers reached their conclusions.
Additional comments:
Below is some input about a few of the questions asked in this survey.

With limited knowledge of the incident, if a breach of patient PHI occurs in the future that is
not clearly identified as reportable by a four-factor risk analysis, will you report or not
report?
Need more info/definition of what you mean with â€œclearly identified as reportableâ€•.
Are you meaning â€œlow compromiseâ€•? It is difficult to select an answer of report or
not report without more information. It is all driven by the 4 factor analysis/ data
compromise which still has a subjective component. I went with â€œclearly identifiedâ€•
as I cannot conclude that the incident resulted in low compromise of data so I would report
it.
An employee at your facility clicked on a link from a Phishing e-mail which led to a
ransomware attack on your facility. Payout was required and access was restored to your
system. The attacker potentially had access to 750 unsecured (unencrypted) patient records
in the system. All policies, procedures, training and risk assessment and management are in
compliance.
Need more information about whether the records were exfiltrated from the facility
“determined by forensics and type of ransomware, etc. And what does attacker potentially
had access to 750 unsecure (unencrypted) patient records? How? I am worried that some
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may read access and select to report, however, without knowing the forensics/other info,
this may not be a reportable breach. Also see OCR guidance on breach notification and
ransomware to make things even more interesting!
I believe they are outdated, but Patient Privacy has come a long way, since I first was
introduced to it.
I do believe that breaches in healthcare are still under-reported. I would find it interesting
what peoples' opinion were of the OCR and its ability to enforce this behemoth called
Breach Notification.
I do believe that for most patients, understanding the HIPAA standards is a difficult task.
However, from a provider point of view, I feel that the standards protect the patient's
information well. I would prefer that both state and federal laws be the same, and also
prefer that the standards apply to all who have access to PHI, including providers who do
not accept insurance. I think technology has outpaced some of the HIPAA provisions, but
overall it has served its purpose. I foresee additional privacy laws on the horizon as
technology advances, but I feel that a complete overhaul of HIPAA is unnecessary.
I do not believe HIPAA is outdated; I believe more rules should be put in to place.
I do not think HIPAA is outdated, since its provisions remain relevant.
I don't think it is outdated, but hard for the average small clinic to comply. It is hard to
understand and leaves the uninformed with fear and guilt as motivators. This will cause
issues regardless of the scenario. Most small clinics do nothing or utilize firms that
specialize in cut and paste forms. The clinic is hard pressed to know if they are clearly
following the law. AND the clinic is responsible ultimately for knowing.
I feel that phishing and cyberattacks are not fully able to be vetted through the current fourstep process very well. We, as an inpatient acute care, locked psychiatric hospital are host to
different types of attacks than normal hospitals and often find ourselves in deep discussion
and workgroups going over what does and does not constitute a threat/risk. It would great to
have more defined guidelines to use. Also, I have not found very much by way of support on
AHIMA for these incidents. Something like a chat board or venue to discuss them would be
greatly beneficial, especially since many Privacy Officers are wearing other hats and
performing other roles and Privacy Officer is just one of their duties. Having a community
of others to vet things with would be awesome!
I feel the criteria to evaluate a breach is not clear and depending on who is evaluating it, can
choose not to report because the person evaluating it might feel that the information is not
compromised where another would see it different. One person feels if a person has
anothers PHI in their hands and reads it, it is a breach even though the person chose to bring

148

it back where another viewing it might feel its a low compromise and not report it. It is very
unclear in evaluating and I feel could definitely be improved.
I have read that a bill has been proposed to reduce the time allowed for notification of
breach to the patient. It takes time to investigate incidents, especially when it can involve out
of state breaches.
I think it is outdated and the requirements are getting more cumbersome and draconian to
implement and maintain compliance.
I think its confusing for everyone and no one really fully understands
I think the breach notification requirements are sufficient.
I think the notion of HIPAA is outdated as any person working within health facilities
understands the importance of confidentiality and privacy. Even with breach notification
being a cumbersome process, I believe in this day and age of identity theft it is a necessary
evil.
If there is access to electronic records, an analysis of risk should not apply. It should be
considered a breach.
It appears OCR only address breaches involving more than 500 patients and bypass
individual breaches.
I feel we need more detailed guidelines as far as exact procedures/practices on how to
protect PHI. For example, Athena does not segregate super-confidential information, nor do
their reports indicate if a staff member views a patient chart on a need to know basis.
Athena reports will only indicate entries made in the chart by staff. I did a test run and
viewed HIV lab results, psychotherapy notes, routine office visits, etc. and Athena reports
only indicate the date and time I opened the patient chart but does not indicate the
documents I viewed nor the time I exited the chart. I receive patient complaints concerning
staff breaching their records but I cannot obtain valid documentation to support or deny their
allegations. Fed regs need to establish and enforce more strict guidelines on protecting
patents civil rights to privacy.
Outdated definitely. Very broad determinations.
Policy makers are not in the trench of privacy breach notification and don't truly understand
what a patient is going to do when we notify them of breach.
Potential for access does not mean the user was trying to acquire PHI, typically ransomware
and physical break ins are attributed the "items" of value (Rxs, equipment, supplies) not
PHI. Many times people that conduct these unfortunate events do not understand the value
of what they have in front of them.
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Reportable breaches to OCR should be limited to significant incidents.
See both sides. I feel its important to notify one who's privacy may be at risk so they can
respond appropriately, however this can easily backfire to cause much more harm than the
actual breach may ever cause. Each case is quite individual and should be evaluated
accordingly. Then rational judgment exercised in deciding to report and notify.
since the regulations were implemented in 2003 and 2005, with limited updates in 2013. I
believe some significant revisions need to take place to the regulations in order to provide
more specific guidance to covered entities.
The Breach Notification is outdated and we need defined reportable measures now that we
are totally electronic. The Omnibus Hi Tech Rule did not update breach notification
The HIPAA legislation in terms of breach notification and its ability to adapt are appropriate
and feel the patient safety and patient's PHI security should be top priority.
The HIPAA policy could definitely use an update. Technology has significantly advanced
since the law was enacted.
There is a gray area in HITECH's reporting rules that makes it difficult to determine exactly
what is required. Privacy professionals are in a tough spot when they take a "gray area"
scenario to administration. What is even tougher is balancing HITECH breach reporting
rules with state rules. If there were a federal rule I could see all breach notification rules
rolling in to one regulation.
There is a lot of grey areas relating to HIPAA and breach notification.
thorough investigation of each incident must be done to determine potentials of a breach, all
facts must be assessed and a team should determine need to report vs one person
to me HIPAA is ever changing and growing and anyone in the field of Privacy should
always stay as current and on top of matters as possible. I do not feel HIPAA is outdated,
but I feel that information given in the realm of the workplace and society is outdated.
Too far over-reaching and impractical.
Unfortunately, current legislation has not caught up to technological advances and risks.
We have been dealing with Privacy in healthcare for years before HIPAA was enacted. We
have adapted throughout the years to assure that we are always maintaining privacy of
patients as well as our workers. HIPAA did not change this in any way, it just made things a
little more difficult to weed through the true breaches vs. the incidentals.
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When performing my OCR notification assessment I also consider the reaction of the patient
when notified of the breach.
While the risk of harm analysis was changed, the low probability of compromise analysis is
basically the same. It's still pretty subjective and based on whether the individuals doing the
assessment think anyone could do anything harmful to the subject individuals.
You should always report an incident
Your scenarios are good but lack key information, #2- if facility was up to date physical
safeguards for records after hours holding and nothing left on desk would have been
minimal plan. #3 systems review by IT would be able to assess large volume movement file
to external IP, addressing if the files were in fact compromised... great study and yes we
must keep instep with IT advancements to ensure privacy for our clients. OCR continues to
lean towards over reporting.

151

APPENDIX K: COPYRIGHT PERMISSIONS

152

153

154

155

156

157

REFERENCES
Adler-Milstein, J., Green, C., Bates, D. (2013). A survey analysis suggests that electronic health
records will yield revenue gains for some practices and losses for many. Health Affairs
32(3). 562-570.
AHC Media LLC. (2016). Hackers target hospitals with “ransomware”. ED LEGAL LETT. 27(4):
1-4.
AHIMA (2013a). Analysis of modifications to the HIPAA privacy, security, enforcement, and
breach notification rules under the Health Information Technology for Economic and
Clinical Health Act and the Genetic Information Nondiscrimination Act; other
modifications to the HIPAA rules. Retrieved 4 June 2014 from
https://library.ahima.org/PdfView?oid=106127
AHIMA (2013b). Performing a Breach Risk Assessment. Journal of AHIMA, 84(9), 66-70.
AHIMA (2018). About AHIMA. Retrieved on September 22, 2018 from
http://www.ahima.org/about/aboutahima.
AHIMA Privacy and Security Council (2015). Sample (Chief) Privacy Officer Job Description.
AHIMA Body of Knowledge. Retrieved on September 23, 2018 from
http://bok.ahima.org/doc?oid=107672#.W6fZmGhKgdU
Amori, G. (2008). Preventing and responding to medical identity theft. Journal of Healthcare
Risk Management: The Journal of the American Society for Healthcare Risk
Management, 28(2), 33-42.
Andoh-Baidoo, F. K., Amoako-Gyampah, K., & Osei-Bryson, K. (2010). How Internet Security
Breaches Harm Market Value. IEEE Security & Privacy (1), 36.
158

Andoh-Baidoo, F. K., & Osei-Bryson, K. (2007). Exploring the characteristics of Internet
security breaches that impact the market value of breached firms. Expert Systems with
Applications, 32703-725
Arrow, K. J. (1971). Essays in the theory of risk-bearing (Vol. 2). Amsterdam, London: NorthHolland Publishing Company.
Babbie, E. R. (2001). The practice of social research. Belmont, CA: Wadsworth Cengage
Learning.
Bai G, Jiang J, & Flasher R. (2017) Hospital Risk of Data Breaches. JAMA Internal Medicine.
Ipswich, MA.
Bazerman, M. H. (1984). The Relevance of Kahneman and Tversky's Concept of Framing to
Organizational Behavior. Journal of Management, 10(3), 333-343.
Bendix, J. (2013). What the HIPAA omnibus rule means for your practice. Contemporary
OB/GYN, 58(6), 34
Bernoulli, D. “Specimen Theorise Novae de Mensura Sortis,” Commentarii Academiae
Scinetiarum Imperialis Petropolitanae Tomus V [Papers of the Imperial Academy of
Sciences in Petersburg, Vol. V] 1738, p175-192 Translated by Sommer, L., “Exposition
of a New Theory on the Measurement of Risk.” Econometrica, Vol 22, No 1 (Jan 54) p2336
Blanke, S. J., & McGrady, E. (2016). When it comes to securing patient health information from
breaches, your best medicine is a dose of prevention: A cybersecurity risk assessment
checklist. Journal of Healthcare Risk Management, (1), 14.

159

Blustein, A. & Lapidus, B. (2010). When do you notify after a HIPAA breach? Same-Day
Surgery, 34(11), 129-131.
Boerner, C. M. (2010). View HIPAA breaches affecting 500 or more individuals online. Journal
of Health Care Compliance, 12(3), 31-68.
Briggs, R. & Zalta, E. (2015). Normative theories of rational choice: Expected utility. The
Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. Retrieved from
http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/win2015/entries/rationality-normative-utility/
Buffone, P. N. (2016). The 'Cure'-All for 21st Century Data Sharing. Pharmaceutical Executive,
36(8), 39.
California Office of Statewide Health Planning and Development (OSHPD) (2015). HIPAA
Definitions and 18 Identifiers. Retrieved on March 6, 2015 from
http://www.oshpd.ca.gov/Boards/CPHS/HIPAAIdentifiers.pdf
Campbell, K., Gordon, L. A., Loeb, M. P., & Zhou, L. (2003). The economic cost of publicly
announced information security breaches: empirical evidence from the stock market.
Journal of Computer Security, 11(3), 431.
Coate, D., & MacDonald, K. (2002). Projecting the budget impacts of HIPAA. Healthcare
Financial Management, 56(2), 42-48.
Collins, J. D. W. (2007). Toothless HIPAA: Searching for a private right of action to remedy
privacy rule violations. Vanderbilt Law Review, 60(1), 199-233.
Corbin, J, & Strauss, A. (2014). Basics of Qualitative Research: Techniques and Procedures for
Developing Grounded Theory. Los Angeles, CA: SAGE Publications, Inc.

160

Dezenhall, E. (2015). A look back at the Target breach. Huffington Post. Retrieved on March 6,
2015 from http://www.huffingtonpost.com/eric-dezenhall/a-look-back-at-thetarget_b_7000816.html
Dimick C. (2010) No harm done? Assessing risk of harm under the federal breach notification
rule. Journal of AHIMA. 81(8):20-25
Eisenmann, C. (2009). When hackers turn to blackmail. Harvard Business Review, 87(10), 3948.
Erlich, Y., Shor, T., Carmi, S., & Pe’er I. (2018). Re-identification of genomic data using long
range familiar searches. bioRxiv. doi: https://doi.org/10.1101/350231
Evangeli, M., Kafaar, Z., Kagee, A., Swartz, L., & Bullemor-Day, P. (n.d). Does message
framing predict willingness to participate in a hypothetical HIV vaccine trial: An
application of Prospect Theory. Aids Care-Psychological and Socio-Medical Aspects of
Aids/Hiv, 25(7), 910-914.
Federal Trade Commission, Bureau of Consumer Protection, Division of Consumer and Business
Education. (2010). Medical identity theft. Retrieved June 6, 2017 from
www.bcbsil.com/pdf/education/wellness/medical_id_theft_consumer_brochure.pdf
Fleming, N., Culler, S., McCorkle, R., Becker, E., Ballard, D. (2011). The financial and
nonfinancial costs of implementing electronic health records in primary care practices.
Health Affairs 30(3). 481-489.
Frank, J. (2016). Don't expect legislative defenses against cyberattacks anytime soon. Medical
Economics, (7), 49.

161

Gabriel, M., Noblin, A., Rutherford, A., Walden, A., & Cortelyou-Ward, K. (2018). Data Breach
Locations, Types, and Associated Characteristics Among US Hospitals. American
Journal of Managed Care, 24(2), 78-84.
Gogtay, N. J. (2010). Principles of sample size calculation. Indian journal of ophthalmology,
58(6), 517.
Grando, M. A., Murcko, A., Mahankali, S., Saks, M., Zent, M., Chern, D., & Hassanzadeh, N.
(2017). A Study to Elicit Behavioral Health Patients' and Providers' Opinions on Health
Records Consent. Journal of Law, Medicine & Ethics, 45(2), 238-259.
Greene, T. (2015). Anthem hack: Personal data stolen sells for 10X price of stolen credit card
numbers. Network World.
Hazra, A., & Gogtay, N. (2016). Biostatistics Series Module 4: Comparing Groups – Categorical
Variables. Indian Journal of Dermatology. 61(4), 385-392.
Heubusch, K. (2011). Little Breaches: OCR Releases First “Small Breach” Data. Journal of
AHIMA, 82(10), 56-57.
Holloway, M., & Fensholt, E. (2013). HHS finalizes HIPAA privacy and data security rules,
including stricter rules for breaches of unsecured PHI. Benefits Law Journal, 26(2), 95102.
Holmes, R., Bromiley, P., Devers, C. E., Holcomb, T. R., & McGuire, J. B. (2011). Management
Theory Applications of Prospect Theory: Accomplishments, Challenges, and
Opportunities. Journal of Management, 37(4), 1069-1107.
Hudson, K. L., & Collins, F. S. (2017). The 21st Century Cures Act - A View from the NIH.
New England Journal of Medicine, 376(2), 111.
162

Jaccard, J., & Jacoby, J. (2010). Theory construction and model-building skills: a practical guide
for social scientists. New York: Guilford Press,
Kahneman, D., & Tversky, A. (1979). Prospect theory: An analysis of decision under
risk. Econometrica: Journal of the Econometric Society, 47(2), 263-291.
Keeve, A. (2016). 7 PR lessons from the largest healthcare data breach in history. Retrieved on
September 23, 2018 from https://www.prnewsonline.com/7-pr-lessons-from-the-largesthealthcare-data-breach-in-history/
Kerr, P., DeAngelis, D., & Brown, T. A. (2014). Five questions to ask before a data breach
occurs. Journal of Health Care Compliance, 16(6), 27-71.
Khansa, L., Cook, D., James, T. & Bruyaka, O. (2012). Impact of HIPAA Provisions on the
Stock Market Value of Healthcare Institutions, and Information Security and Other
Information Technology Firms. Computers & Security, 31(6). 750-770.
Khansa, L., & Liginlal, D. (2009). Quantifying the Benefits of Investing in Information Security.
Communications of the ACM, 52(11), 113-117.
Kim, K., Browe, D., Logan, H., Holm, R., Hack, L., & Ohno-Machado, L. (2014). Data
governance requirements for distributed clinical research networks: triangulating
perspectives of diverse stakeholders. Journal of the American Medical Informatics
Association, 21(4), 714-719.
Korolov, M. (2015). Health-related data breaches could be expensive and life-threatening.
Network World.

163

Kraemer, S., & Carayon, P. (2007). Human errors and violations in computer and information
security: The viewpoint of network administrators and security specialists. Applied
Ergonomics, 38, 143-154.
Kroll Advisory Solutions (2012). 2012 HIMSS analytics report: security of patient data.
Retrieved on June 4, 2017 from
http://csbweb01.uncw.edu/people/cummingsj/classes/mis534/articles/Previous%20Article
s/Ch6SecurityReport.pdf
Kruse, C. S., Frederick, B., Jacobson, T., & Monticone, D. K. (2017). Cybersecurity in
healthcare: A systematic review of modern threats and trends. Technology & Health
Care, 25(1), 1-10.
LaTour, K. & Eichenwald-Maki, S. (2006). Health Information Management Concepts,
Principles, and Practice. Chicago, IL: American Health Information Management
Association.
LaTour, K. & Eichenwald-Maki, S. (2013). Health Information Management Concepts,
Principles, and Practice: Fourth Edition. Chicago, IL: American Health Information
Management Association.
Liginlal, D., Sim, I., & Khansa, L. (2009). How significant is human error as a cause of privacy
breaches? An empirical study and a framework for error management. Computers &
Security, 28215-228
Liginlal, D., Sim, I., Khansa, L., & Fearn, P. (2012). HIPAA Privacy Rule Compliance: An
Interpretive Study Using Norman’s Action Theory. Computers & Security, 31(2). 206220.
164

Majumder, M. A., Guerrini, C. J., Bollinger, J. M., McGuire, A. L., & Cook-Deegan, R. (2017).
Sharing data under the 21st Century Cures Act. Genetics in Medicine, 19(12), 1289-1294.
Marshall, A. (1890). Principles of economics: an introductory volume.
Martin, K. D., Borah, A., & Palmatier, R. W. (2017). Data Privacy: Effects on Customer and
Firm Performance. Journal Of Marketing, 81(1), 36-58.
McMillan, M. (2015). The cost of IT security. Healthcare Financial Management: Journal of the
Healthcare Financial Management Association, 69(4), 44-47.
Melnik, T. (2012). Class actions, federal actions, and state actions: The data breach saga
continues. Journal of Health Care Compliance, 14(2), 45-48.
Modifications to the HIPAA Privacy, Security, Enforcement, and Breach Notification Rules
Under the Health Information Technology for Economic and Clinical Health Act and the
Genetic Information Nondiscrimination Act; Other Modifications to the HIPAA Rules;
Health and Human Services, 78 Fed Reg. (January 25, 2013) (to be codified at 45 C.F.R
pts 160 & 164).
Novemsky, N. (2013). Nathan Novemsky: Risk Aversion in Decision Making. Retrieved from
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=9AXLmjoaI60&list=PLE7C7B02ACB9E746C&featu
re=share&index=5
Qniemiec (2011). Risk Premium. Used under CCO 1.0/Combined graphs. Retrieved from
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Risk_aversion
Parks, C., & Monson, K. (2017). Automated Facial Recognition of Computed TomographyDerived Facial Images: Patient Privacy Implications. Journal of Digital Imaging, 30(2),
204-214.
165

Pallant, J. (2013). SPSS survival manual: a step by step guide to data analysis using IBM SPSS.
Maidenhead, Berkshire, England: McGraw Hill.
Ponemon Institute (2013). Third annual patient privacy & data security study. Retrieved on June
4, 2017 from http://www.ponemon.org/library/third-annual-patient-privacy-data-securitystudy?s=privacy
Ponemon Institute (2014). Fourth annual benchmark study on patient privacy & data security.
Retrieved on June 4, 2017 from http://www.ponemon.org/library/fourth-annualbenchmark-study-on-patient-privacy-data-security?s=privacy
Ponemon Institute (2015). Fifth annual benchmark study on patient privacy & data security.
Retrieved on June 4, 2017 from http://www.ponemon.org/library/fifth-annualbenchmark-study-on-privacy-security-of-healthcare-data?s=privacy
Ponemon Institute (2016). Sixth annual benchmark study on patient privacy & data security.
Retrieved on June 4, 2017 from http://www.ponemon.org/library/sixth-annualbenchmark-study-on-privacy-security-of-healthcare-data-1?s=privacy
Pratt, J. W. (1964). Risk aversion in the small and in the large. Econometrica: Journal of the
Econometric Society, 122-136.
Pritts, J. (2002). Altered states: state health privacy laws and the impact of the federal health
privacy rule. Yale Journal of Health Policy, Law, and Ethics. 2(2), 6.
Raosoft (2017). Sample size calculator. Retrieved June 6, 2017 from
http://www.raosoft.com/samplesize.html
RAVE Mobile Safety (2018). Rave mobile safety survey unearths discrepancies about which
emergencies occur at facilities and the preparedness plans they have in place. Retrieved
166

on November 4, 2018 from https://www.prnewswire.com/news-releases/rave-mobilesafety-survey-unearths-discrepancies-about-which-emergencies-occur-in-healthcarefacilities-and-the-preparedness-plans-they-have-in-place-300735983.html
Reinhart-Thompson (2013). Introduction to Health Information Privacy and Security. Chicago;
Illinois: American Health Information Management Association, 2013.
Rothstein, M. (2013). HIPAA Privacy Rule 2.0. Journal of Law, Medicine & Ethics, 41(2), 525528.
Salamon, L. M. (2002). The tools of government: a guide to the new governance. Oxford; New
York: Oxford University Press, 2002.
Smith, K.B. & Larimer, C. W. (2013). The public policy theory primer (2nd ed.). Boulder, CO:
Westview Press.
Squires, D. and Anderson, C. (2015). U.S. health care from a global perspective: spending, use
of services, prices, and health in 13 countries. The Commonwealth Fund, 1819 (15).
Terry, K. (2015). HIPAA breach: secure data & prevent fines--here's how. Medical Economics,
(14), 26.
Tversky, A., & Kahneman, D. (1991). Loss aversion in riskless choice: a reference-dependent
model. Quarterly Journal of Economics, 106(4), 1039-1061.
Tversky, A., & Kahneman, D. (1992). Advances in prospect theory: Cumulative representation
of uncertainty. Journal of Risk and uncertainty, 5(4), 297-323.
United States. Department of Health and Human Services. Office for Civil Rights. (2011a).
Annual Report to Congress on Breaches of Unsecured Protected Health Information for
Calendar Years 2009 and 2010. Retrieved 9 November 2013 from the Department of
167

Health and Human Services website at
http://www.hhs.gov/ocr/privacy/hipaa/administrative/breachnotificationrule/breachrept.p
df
United States. Department of Health and Human Services. Office for Civil Rights. (2011x).
Annual Report to Congress on Breaches of Unsecured Protected Health Information for
Calendar Years 2013 and 2014. Retrieved 4 June 2017 from the Department of Health
and Human Services website at https://www.hhs.gov/sites/default/files/rtc-breach20132014.pdf
United States. Department of Health and Human Services. Office for Civil Rights. (2011b). HHS
Announces First HIPAA Breach Settlement Involving Less Than 500 Patients. Retrieved
9 November 2013 from the Department of Health and Human Services website at
http://www.hhs.gov/news/press/2013pres/01/20130102a.html
United States. Department of Health and Human Services. Office for Civil Rights. (2016). FACT
SHEET: Ransomware and HIPAA. Retrieved 19 March 2017 from the Department of
Health and Human Services website at
https://www.hhs.gov/sites/default/files/RansomwareFactSheet.pdf
United States. Department of Health and Human Services. Office for Civil Rights. (2017).
Resolution Agreements. Retrieved 10 August 2010 from the Department of Health and
Human Services website at https://www.hhs.gov/hipaa/for-professionals/complianceenforcement/agreements/index.html

168

United States. Government Accountability Office. (2016). Electronic Health Information: HHS
Needs to Strengthen Security and Privacy Guidance and Oversight. Retrieved 10 August
2017 from https://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-16-771
Vinson, D. D. (2011). No more paper tiger: promise and peril as HIPAA goes HITECH. Journal
of Healthcare Risk Management, 30(3), 28-37.
Warner, D. (2013). When to Send a Breach Notification: New HIPAA Rules Revise “Harm”
Standard. Journal of AHIMA, 84(4), 42-43.
Wikina, S. B. (2014). What Caused the Breach? An Examination of Use of Information
Technology and Health Data Breaches. Perspectives in Health Information Management,
1-16.
Wilder, M., Bennett, B., Bianchi, M., & Peters, N. (2013). HHS issues new HITECH/HIPAA
rule: Top 10 changes. Intellectual Property & Technology Law Journal, 25(5), 19-23.
Winn, P. A. (2001). Confidentiality in cyberspace: the HIPAA privacy rules and the common
law. Rutgers LJ, 33, 617.
Wood, C. C., & Banks, W. J. (1993). Human error: an overlooked but significant information
security problem. Computers & Security, (1). 51.
Zarate, O. A., Brody, J. G., Brown, P., Ramirez-Andreotta, M. D., Perovich, L., & Matz, J.
(2016). Balancing Benefits and Risks of Immortal Data. Hastings Center Report, 46(1),
36-45.

169

